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                                                            Abstract 
A number of autobiographical memory theories and clinical theories of posttraumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD) make claims that are different from standard views of memory, 
and have been the subject of controversy. These claims include: The existence of a long-
term perceptual memory system supporting conscious experience separate to episodic 
memory; greater involvement of perceptual memory in the response to emotion-laden and 
personally meaningful events; increased perceptual memory intrusions accompanied by 
impaired episodic memory for the traumatic event among PTSD patients; and a lack of 
association, or inverse association, between indices of voluntary recall and involuntary 
images relating to the same traumatic materials. In this article I review current research 
on perceptual memory, which supports the presence of long-term representations that are 
selective or incomplete reflections of sensory input. The functional independence of 
perceptual and episodic memory is illustrated by research on verbal overshadowing but is 
most clearly exemplified by the strong evidence in favor of enhanced perceptual memory 
and impaired episodic memory in PTSD. Theoretical predictions concerning the relation 
between perceptual priming and the development of intrusive images, the effect of verbal 
versus visuospatial secondary tasks on intrusive trauma images, and the independence of 
voluntary and involuntary memory for the same materials, have garnered widespread 
support.  Reasons for the continuing controversy over traumatic memory are discussed, 
and some implications of the review for general theories of recall and recognition, 
clinical theories of PTSD, and “special mechanism” views of memory, are set out.
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 One of the most characteristic features of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is 
the involuntary intrusion of vivid and detailed images in which the traumatic scenes are 
re-experienced as though they were occurring in the present (flashbacks). This has led to 
PTSD being viewed as a disorder of memory (Brewin, 2003; McNally, 2003; van der 
Kolk, 2007), a proposal supported by recent research (Brewin, 2011a; Bryant, O'Donnell, 
Creamer, McFarlane, & Silove, 2011; Gootzeit & Markon, 2011). These frequent 
involuntary images are claimed to co-exist with impairments in the ability to retrieve 
ordinary episodic memories of the trauma. Drawing in part on some existing accounts of 
memory (R. Brown & Kulik, 1977; Johnson & Multhaup, 1992; Pillemer & White, 1989) 
as well as observations of patients (Janet, 1904), clinical theories of PTSD have proposed 
that flashbacks are the result of enhanced perceptual priming (Ehlers & Clark, 2000), are 
the product of a separate, image-based memory system (Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 
1996), or arise because of a disconnection between such a memory system and episodic 
memories supported by medial temporal lobe structures (Brewin, Gregory, Lipton, & 
Burgess, 2010). All these theories therefore require the existence of a specialized long-
term perceptual memory system that is functionally independent of episodic memory. 
The purpose of this article is to review the evidence for these claims, to establish their 
relevance to PTSD, and to bring out more general implications for the study of memory. 
There has been a long-standing debate over whether visual information is stored in a 
depictive form (Kosslyn, Thompson, & Ganis, 2006; Paivio, 1971, 1991), corresponding to a 
distinct, specialized system retaining the spatial configuration of the sensory input, or in a 
more abstract propositional form in which perceptual information is just one feature among 
many within a single memory system (Pylyshyn, 2002). Whereas neuroimaging studies 
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comparing visual imagery and perceptual tasks have supported the case for depictive 
representations (Borst & Kosslyn, 2008), studies of change blindness have strengthened the 
view that visual information may be retained in gist form rather than as a detailed pictorial 
representation (Simons & Levin, 1997). There has also been disagreement over whether a 
long-term perceptual memory store, if such exists, does (R. Brown & Kulik, 1977; Chun & 
Johnson, 2011; Goodman, 1980; Janet, 1904; Johnson & Multhaup, 1992; Pillemer, 1998) or 
does not (M. A. Conway, 2001, 2005; Tulving & Schacter, 1990) support conscious 
experience.  
Other areas of controversy concern the functional relations between this hypothetical 
perceptual memory store and ordinary episodic memory. Clinical theories (Brewin, Dalgleish, 
et al., 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Foa & Rothbaum, 1998) take their cue in part from 
experimental research suggesting that the hormonal effects of acute trauma may 
simultaneously diminish neural activity in anatomical structures serving conscious processing 
and enhance activity in structures serving perception (Jacobs & Nadel, 1985; Metcalfe & 
Jacobs, 1998). This research implies that under some circumstances the strength of 
involuntary image-based trauma memories is unrelated to, or inversely related to, the strength 
of voluntary memory for the trauma as measured using indices of recall or recognition. In 
contrast, other researchers have asserted that all forms of traumatic memory are invariably 
clearer and better remembered than non-traumatic memories (McNally, 2003; Porter & Birt, 
2001; Rubin, Berntsen, & Bohni, 2008; Shobe & Kihlstrom, 1997). More specifically, some 
have argued that increased involuntary memories of an emotional event would be expected to 
strengthen voluntary recall and recognition, leading to a positive correlation between the two 
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types of remembering (Ferree & Cahill, 2009). These different views make this one of the 
most contentious issues in the study of memory for trauma. 
 The claims put forward concerning the relations between perceptual and episodic 
memory also have significant implications for our understanding of memory more 
generally. For example, there is an important paradox concerning the psychological 
treatment of PTSD. One of the most effective treatments is based on exposure, in which 
patients are required to deliberately and repeatedly rehearse their trauma memories in 
extreme detail, taking audio recordings to enable them to practice at home (S. P. Cahill, 
Rothbaum, Resick, & Follette, 2009). According to most standard theories of memory 
this kind of rehearsal would be expected to strengthen the trauma memory representation 
(Crowder, 1976) and, by extension, to exacerbate the disorder, but the opposite is 
observed (Hackmann, Ehlers, Speckens, & Clark, 2004; Speckens, Ehlers, Hackmann, & 
Clark, 2006). Although there are a few examples of rehearsal apparently weakening 
rather than strengthening memory, such as massed repetition decrements (Kuhl & 
Anderson, 2011), semantic satiation effects (L. C. Smith, 1984), and unpriming (Sparrow 
& Wegner, 2006), such effects have never been demonstrated for autobiographical 
memory. There does therefore appear to be a prima facie contradiction between standard 
memory theory and clinical practice that invites deeper understanding. 
 This article first considers the different ways in which perceptual memory for 
non-autobiographical material has been studied, including brief and longer-lasting 
representations, in a section titled Types of Perceptual Memory. The second section 
(Long-Term Perceptual Memory for Autobiographical Events) describes work on 
autobiographical memory, including the proposal that a type of perceptual memory is 
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involved in the phenomenon of flashbulb memory. The third section (Interaction Between 
Perceptual and Episodic Memory) reviews research on situations characterized by 
independence between perceptual memory and episodic memory. Presentation of theories 
of PTSD in a fourth section (Perceptual and Episodic Memory in PTSD) is followed by 
reviews of the evidence that the disorder is accompanied simultaneously by a 
strengthening of involuntary perceptual memory and an impairment of voluntary episodic 
memory. A fifth section (Trauma-Related Research on Interactions Involving Perceptual 
and Episodic Memory) then examines the evidence that in the presence of traumatic 
stimuli these systems may demonstrate functional independence. A variety of reasons for 
the continuing controversy over the nature of traumatic memory are put forward in a sixth 
section (Reflections on the Controversy Concerning Memory Impairment in PTSD), 
followed by the implications of this review for the study of memory (Conclusions and 
Recommendations), both in healthy participants and in those suffering from PTSD. 
 
                                                     Types of Perceptual Memory 
The idea of a perceptual memory system has been most often associated with the notion 
of a very short-term ‘sensory’ or ‘iconic’ store, but it has also been considered in relation to 
representations that are able to endure over longer periods. Studies have suggested that a 
tripartite division into sensory memory, short-term memory, and long-term memory is a 
useful way of summarizing current knowledge (Luck & Hollingworth, 2008). 
 
Sensory Memory 
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The term ‘sensory memory’ or ‘iconic memory’ generally refers to a short-term 
memory store that briefly retains sensory traces in the form of a rapidly decaying image 
following the brief presentation of a visual stimulus (Long, 1980). Typically the impressions 
last for up to one second, are pre-categorical (i.e., relatively unprocessed), have high capacity, 
and are sensitive to spatial position (Phillips, 1974; Sperling, 1963). There is also evidence for 
a corresponding pre-categorical acoustic store that holds perceptual representations of sounds 
in a relatively unprocessed form (Crowder & Morton, 1969; Frankish, 2008). Research has 
supported the existence of several types of early visual memory, all with a duration of the 
order of several hundred milliseconds, available for recoding into short-term and long-term 
memory (Irwin & Thomas, 2008). Emotional stimuli receive more prolonged processing in 
sensory memory than do neutral stimuli (Kuhbandner, Spitzer, & Pekrun, 2011).  
 
Short-Term Perceptual Memory 
A long-held view is that short-term perceptual memory representations are created 
rapidly either from external sensory input or from stored representations, have to be actively 
maintained, are resource-demanding, and are very limited in the information they can contain 
at one time (Luck, 2008). Typically the continuing representation of not more than five or six 
relatively simple objects can be maintained for many seconds. These representations are 
coded in relatively abstract formats that permit their maintenance across delay and subsequent 
perceptual processing (Luck, 2008), in contrast to the detailed but much more fleeting 
perceptual information that is maintained in sensory memory. Recent research has found 
evidence for another type of visual short-term memory (VSTM) representation known as 
“fragile VSTM” (Sligte, Vandenbroucke, Scholte, & Lamme, 2010) which is midway 
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between sensory memory and conventional short-term memory in terms of the number of 
high-resolution objects that can be maintained and the lifetime of the representations.  
Among their functions, short-term representations are thought to be involved in binding 
together individual sensory features to form a stable object, episodic memory, or action 
sequence. According to one prominent theory, this binding is brought about by focusing 
attention on an object or scene, so that the individual features are integrated by virtue of 
sharing the same location in space (Treisman & Gelade, 1980). This form of memory also 
permits rehearsal and the creation of more enduring representations in long-term memory. 
Within the working memory framework (Baddeley, 1986) separate short-term memory 
stores exist in the visual (visuospatial sketchpad) and auditory (phonological loop) modalities. 
These stores retain information for limited periods of time so that cognitive operations (e.g., 
selection, manipulation, rehearsal) can be performed on their contents, under the control of 
the central executive. The vividness of recollections is determined in part by the availability 
of modality-specific working memory resources for maintaining information from long-term 
memory (Andrade, Kavanagh, & Baddeley, 1997; Baddeley & Andrade, 2000).  
The working memory framework has also been applied to autobiographical memories. 
The emotionality and vividness of visual images corresponding to autobiographical events 
were selectively reduced by side-to-side eye movements, a task involving both visual and 
spatial interference, relative to a verbal (articulatory suppression) task (Kemps & Tiggemann, 
2007). The opposite effect was obtained with auditory images of autobiographical events. 
This finding has since been extended to traumatic events experienced by patients with PTSD, 
for whom the vividness and emotionality of their visual images were reduced more by eye 
movements than by counting aloud (Lilley, Andrade, Turpin, Sabin-Farrell, & Holmes, 2009). 
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 An influential conceptualization of the attentional processes that support visual short-
term memory (Kosslyn, et al., 2006) proposed the existence of a buffer that contains 
information from the entire visual field. Only some of this information can be processed in 
detail, and an attention window selects some of the information in the buffer for further 
processing. Information in the attention window is sent to an object-properties processing 
system, where an abstract structural description is created on the basis of features such as 
shape and color, and can be compared with previously stored representations. This attention 
window has many similarities with conventional ideas about short-term memory, whereas the 
contents of the visual buffer may correspond to fragile VSTM. 
 
Long-Term Perceptual Memory 
Studies conducted within the working memory framework determined that attended 
information can be stored out of consciousness during gaps between operations, suggesting 
the need for a longer-term memory store, sometimes referred to as a visual cache (Quinn, 
2008), that is able to support explicit memory operations. Reflecting the fact that most 
research has been conducted on experimental stimuli of low intrinsic memorability, there has 
been a correspondingly larger focus on priming and recognition as indices of memory.  
Priming. Priming refers to the increased ease or speed of identification of a stimulus 
that the person has previously seen relative to one that was not previously seen. Priming is a 
form of implicit memory, in that it does not involve explicit recall of the previous stimulus 
exposure, and has been noted for words, shapes, pictures, and objects. Tulving and Schacter 
(1990) argued that the independence of priming and explicit memory performance made it 
highly unlikely that priming was the product of the kind of focal and abstract representations 
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thought to support explicit recognition and recall. Rather, the data implied the existence of 
multiple distributed representations of features, including perceptual features, that could only 
be accessed by very specific cues. They therefore proposed the existence of a pre-semantic 
perceptual representation system (PRS), its operations being disconnected from consciousness 
and its products not providing a basis for awareness of previous experience. 
From the outset priming studies indicated that even using relatively simple stimuli such 
as words there was greater informational persistence than was suggested by sensory memory 
studies, with effects regularly observed up to 24 hours post-stimulus presentation (Cave, 
1997). Even more persistent priming was demonstrated when participants were shown 
fragmented pictures and had to name the object they contained. After having seen the pictures 
once, savings were found when participants were reshown the pictures as long as 48 weeks 
later. These effects appeared to be independent of recognition memory (Cave, 1997). Using 
these methods perceptual priming has been observed over periods as long as 17 years 
(Kennedy, Rodrigue, & Raz, 2007; Mitchell, 2006).  
Spatial priming and memory. Recalling the spatial location of objects can rely on 
coding the information in relation to the perceiver (egocentric perspective) or in relation to the 
external world (allocentric perspective). It has been proposed that egocentric information 
derived from the dorsal visual stream is used in the service of visuomotor control whereas 
allocentric information derived from the ventral visual stream supports perception and object 
recognition (Milner & Goodale, 1993). According to Milner and Goodale, egocentric 
information cannot support perception and is only stored for a very brief period of time. In 
contrast, other theorists have provided evidence for parallel representational stores that 
capture both egocentric and allocentric information (Byrne, Becker, & Burgess, 2007). Byrne 
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et al. proposed that the dorsal visual stream processes relatively raw, sensation-near 
information from the entire visual field whereas the ventral stream is involved in the 
extraction of abstract features and the detailed classification of attended information.  
Both egocentric and allocentric information appear to be used in spatial memory tasks 
(Burgess, Spiers, & Paleologou, 2004). The length of time egocentric information remains 
available has beeen addressed by studies of spatial priming, the tendency for objects to be 
more readily located in positions where they have previously been seen. This research 
indicates that egocentric information for simple stimuli encountered in the laboratory is stored 
for at least two minutes (K. Ball, Smith, Ellison, & Schenk, 2009, 2010). 
Recognition memory. A series of experiments has established that the brain has an 
enormous capacity to store information about briefly presented complex visual material over 
long periods. Recognition of 200 photographs presented for five seconds each was well above 
chance after a delay of nearly a year (Nickerson, 1968), and in another study participants were 
very accurate at recognizing which of 10,000 briefly glimpsed photographs they had been 
shown five days earlier (Standing, 1973). Importantly, perceptual information appears to be 
retained, not just the gist of objects or scenes. One study found long-term memory for details 
of observed actions (Urgolites & Wood, 2013), and in another participants were able to detect 
that a single object had changed orientation after having viewed 48 different scenes and 
hundreds of individual objects 24 hours earlier (Hollingworth, 2005). Individuals briefly 
shown thousands of scenes over several hours were later able to distinguish these scenes from 
similar examples with high accuracy (Konkle, Brady, Alvarez, & Oliva, 2010).  
These striking results are consistent with evidence that in visual search tasks detailed 
information is encoded automatically leading to above-chance object discrimination 
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(Williams, Henderson, & Zacks, 2005). The features of events that are thought to be 
automatically encoded include spatial location, time, and frequency of occurrence (Hasher & 
Zacks, 1979). Of particular relevance to this article is the automatic encoding of spatial 
information, which has now been shown using a variety of paradigms (Treisman & Zhang, 
2006; Zhang, Xuan, Fu, & Pylyshyn, 2010).  
This degree of memory for briefly presented stimuli clearly cannot depend on the very 
limited capacity offered by short-term memory stores, and implies that either a visual buffer 
(Kosslyn, et al., 2006) or sensory memory provide an alternative access route to long-term 
visual memory. The brief duration of sensory memory means that such long-term 
representations are very unlikely to contain complete and detailed pictorial information that 
maps directly onto the perceptual experience. Rather, perceptual experience would have to be 
recoded in a way that captures a significant amount of information about form, color etc. and 
that then permits later recognition. Kosslyn et al.’s visual buffer, which is not dependent on 
the current focus of attention but maintains information about the wider visual field, may 
provide this recoding. Entry to the buffer is likely to depend on visual fixation, however brief 
(Nelson & Loftus, 1980; Williams, et al., 2005). 
Studies of incidental memory for voices have found weaker recognition effects than 
for visual stimuli, but indicate an above chance ability for delayed recognition of individual 
voices that declines over the first few weeks (Clifford, 1980). Similarly, studies of memory 
for words indicate that participants can remember details of the voice reading the words for 
one day when given an explicit recognition test, and for one week when given an implicit 
perceptual identification test (Goldinger, 1996), supporting the idea that some perceptual 
information related to the specific learning episode is routinely encoded. Although rarely 
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studied, evidence for long-term olfactory memory lasting as long as several years has also 
been reported (Goldman & Seamon, 1992; Lehrner, 1993). 
Summary 
 As proposed by a number of theorists (R. Brown & Kulik, 1977; Chun & Johnson, 
2011; Johnson & Multhaup, 1992; Paivio, 1971; Pillemer, 1998), a distinction between 
memory systems specialized for verbal and perceptual (visual, spatial, auditory, olfactory) 
material has emerged from studies of both short-term and long-term memory for non-
autobiographical material. In the case of visual material, information that has been only 
briefly fixated appears to be encoded automatically and to form a relatively stable 
representation in long-term memory that then supports both priming and conscious forms of 
memory such as recognition. The form of this representation is thought to be a higher-level 
abstraction of the original input that preserves many perceptual features of it while not 
corresponding to a detailed and complete sensory image. This automatic encoding co-exists 
with the facility for more deliberate encoding based on a prolonged holding of material in 
focal attention, rehearsal, etc. One implication is that there may be a variety of visual 
representations of a particular event, differing in their content (visual, spatial, etc.) and in the 
extent of feature integration that has taken place. Further evidence for long-term perceptual 
representations comes from the literature on autobiographical memory. 
 
             Long-Term Perceptual Memory for Autobiographical Events 
Perceptual details have invariably featured strongly in accounts of the recall of personal 
memories (Brewer, 1986, 1996), and this has been particularly true of events that are 
significant for the individual or include traumatic elements. The 19th century French physician 
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and psychologist Pierre Janet, who studied the recall of traumatic events, was one of the first 
to propose the existence of an image-based memory system that captured sensory and 
perceptual details of significant scenes and was distinct from a verbally based narrative 
memory system (Janet, 1904). A number of other theorists (Johnson & Multhaup, 1992; 
Pillemer & White, 1989) have similarly proposed the existence of a separate long-term 
perceptual memory store that can support conscious experience. This system, they argued, is 
present from birth with its contents expressed through images, whereas the episodic system, 
developing in early childhood, is dependent on language with its contents expressed through 
narrative. Consistent with Janet’s observations, it has been noted that people describing 
frightening experiences from the past often shift spontaneously into the present tense without 
realizing what they are doing (Pillemer, Desrochers, & Ebanks, 1998). Pillemer and 
colleagues suggested that in describing terrifying events there is an upswell of perceptual 
imagery, so that people are no longer simply recounting an episode but are effectively reliving 
some salient aspect of it, causing them to spontaneously fall into the present tense. 
Perceptual information has been identified as belonging to the lowest or most specific 
level in an influential model of autobiographical knowledge that incorporates a hierarchy of 
specificity: lifetime periods, general events, and event-specific knowledge (M. A. Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Later versions of the theory proposed a separate memory system that 
retains detailed sensory and perceptual knowledge over relatively brief retention intervals 
measured in minutes and hours (M. A. Conway, 2001, 2005), but then suggested that its 
contents, although hard to access without the necessary retrieval cues, may be permanent (M. 
A. Conway, 2009). Retrieval from this perceptual memory system is proposed to be 
involuntary rather than deliberate and corresponds to a recollective experience or reliving.  
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Flashbulb Memories 
 
A focus of interest for those studying emotion and memory has been the level of recall 
for the circumstances in which individuals learned of shocking events such as the 
assassination of a prominent public figure. These were termed ‘flashbulb memories’ (R. 
Brown & Kulik, 1977) on the basis that they possessed “a primary, ‘live’ quality that is 
almost perceptual. Indeed, it is very like a photograph that indiscriminately preserves the 
scene in which each of us found himself when the flashbulb was fired” (p. 74). This account 
of flashbulb memory followed an existing notion (Livingston, 1967) that a surprising or 
emotion-arousing event triggered a “Now Print” mechanism that indiscriminately recorded 
any ongoing neural activity in the form of an enduring image. Brown and Kulik were clear, 
however, that this was an imperfect analogy: They commented perspicaciously that flashbulb 
memories did not record all details indiscriminately and were usually far from complete.  
There is general acceptance that flashbulb memories of how a very significant event 
was learned about may endure over long periods (Berntsen & Thomsen, 2005). In addition 
such memories are sometimes more vivid and detailed than ordinary memories and better 
recalled than information about the event that triggered the flashbulb (Bohannon, 1988; 
Kvavilashvili, Mirani, Schlagman, Erskine, & Kornbrot, 2010; Kvavilashvili, Mirani, 
Schlagman, & Kornbrot, 2003; Rubin & Kozin, 1984; Talarico & Rubin, 2003; Talarico & 
Rubin, 2007; Weaver & Krug, 2004; Yarmey & Bull, 1978). Flashbulbs are also associated 
with more intense emotional responses (Holland & Kensinger, 2010; Talarico, LaBar, & 
Rubin, 2004; Talarico & Rubin, 2007). 
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In contrast, there has been controversy over whether flashbulb memories involve a 
special mechanism such as “Now Print” for preserving perceptual detail. This claim has 
primarily been evaluated by asking whether flashbulb memories are more accurate than non-
flashbulb memories. Some studies have certainly indicated that flashbulb memories are often 
remarkably consistent. Over 85% of a UK sample reported flashbulb memories following the 
resignation of British prime minister Margaret Thatcher in 1990, and their reports collected 11 
months after the event corresponded exactly to their descriptions given two weeks after the 
resignation (M. A. Conway et al., 1994). The authors noted that the actual words participants 
used were not the same, suggesting that they were not recalling their previous description but 
rather an image or memory of the actual reception event. Similarly, studies of the September 
11 2001 attacks on the U.S. reveal that the majority of questions used to assess flashbulb 
memory were answered consistently over delays of 1-2 years (A. R. A. Conway, Skitka, 
Hemmerich, & Kershaw, 2009; Kvavilashvili, Mirani, Schlagman, Foley, & Kornbrot, 2009).  
Other articles, however, have emphasized that flashbulb memories may show evidence 
of inconsistency and are not always more consistent than non-flashbulb memories (Larsen, 
1992; Neisser & Harsch, 1992; Talarico & Rubin, 2003; Talarico & Rubin, 2007). For 
example, Neisser and Harsch reported high degrees of inconsistency for memories of hearing 
about the Challenger explosion three years previously. They concluded that flashbulb 
memories did not have special qualities but were likely ordinary memories that had been 
subject to additional rehearsal. Other authors have come to the same conclusion (McCloskey, 
Wible, & Cohen, 1988). 
As has previously been noted (Kvavilashvili, et al., 2009), the focus on consistency has 
thrown up awkward questions concerning what features should be measured, how they should 
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be measured, and what degree of consistency over what time period should characterize a 
flashbulb memory. But it is now clear that the issue of whether flashbulb memories involve a 
more detailed perceptual record of an experience than ordinary memories, and whether they 
are more consistent, are logically distinct questions. Once past the stage of sensory or iconic 
memory, perceptual memory involves synthesis and selection (see section on Types of 
Perceptual Memory). Likewise, amygdala activation prompted by arousing experiences leads 
to the subjective experience of a vivid memory and to the registration of more event details, 
but not to the registration of all event details (Holland & Kensinger, 2010; Kensinger, Garoff-
Eaton, & Schacter, 2006). Thus, the appropriate question may not be whether a narrative of 
the circumstances in which the person learned of the flashbulb-eliciting event is consistent or 
inconsistent, but whether specific images are prompted by questions or reminders about the 
event and whether their contents are consistent or inconsistent. 
At recall individuals must make a selection from available perceptual details, and this 
selection may vary across recall occasions. Nor does hearing of an event necessarily consist 
of a single experience but it may be protracted, with new and more shocking information 
coming to light over a period of time. It is quite possible, therefore, that multiple perceptual 
records are encoded so that, even if each one of them were perfectly accurate, inconsistency 
could arise from retrieving some of them and not others (Kvavilashvili, et al., 2009; Neisser & 
Harsch, 1992). The implication is that just because a memory is strongly perceptual does not 
mean it is necessarily more accurate in every respect. 
Among other ways of identifying the presence of ‘special mechanisms’ is to conduct 
taxometric analyses on flashbulb memory data to test whether scores fall onto a continuum 
(suggesting they are simply a vivid form of ordinary memory) or into two separate categories 
                                                          Episodic Memory, Perceptual Memory and PTSD 
                                                                                                                                       18 
 
(suggesting they represent a different form of memory). A recent study of memories for the 
Pope’s death (Lanciano & Curci, 2012) found clear evidence for a latent categorical structure. 
The authors concluded that their findings supported the idea of flashbulb memories as 
recollections of event-specific sensory-perceptual details, different from ordinary 
autobiographical memory. Other studies have found that the correlates of flashbulb and event 
memories for the same incident are different (Curci & Luminet, 2006; Hirst et al., 2009), also 
supporting the fact they may have a different underlying basis.  
Summary 
 
Unlike studies of experimental materials, which have mainly relied on measures of 
priming or recognition, research using personally meaningful autobiographical memories has 
placed a much greater emphasis on recall, both voluntary and involuntary. These studies are 
consistent with investigations using experimental stimuli in suggesting that visual memories 
are not simply gist-based and that high levels of perceptual detail concerning scenes and 
events can be preserved over long periods. Although studies of autobiographical memory 
have emphasized the important role played by perceptual information, this information is 
mostly embedded within the context of the episodic memory. Such studies cannot speak 
convincingly to the claim that such information is supported by a distinct memory system.        
 
Interaction Between Perceptual and Episodic Memory 
Of particular theoretical interest is the relation between episodic and perceptual 
memory. Under normal conditions, for example the conscious recall of significant 
autobiographical events, both are likely to be enhanced. The flashbulb memory literature 
showing increased perceptual memory for notable events is consistent with there being 
                                                          Episodic Memory, Perceptual Memory and PTSD 
                                                                                                                                       19 
 
corresponding improvements in memory for non-perceptual details. Although there is some 
limited evidence that emotions may selectively strengthen perceptual over other types of 
memory (Arntz, de Groot, & Kindt, 2005; Kensinger, Addis, & Atapattu, 2011; Kensinger & 
Schacter, 2007), what are of value are demonstrations that under certain conditions there is a 
dissociation between episodic and perceptual memory, with one functioning more effectively 
and the other less effectively. Two areas of the literature, concerned with verbal over-
shadowing and the use of automatic cameras to prompt recall, are relevant to this question. 
 
Verbal Overshadowing 
 
A demonstration that verbally-influenced and perceptual representations of the same 
stimulus event may sometimes compete comes from work on verbal overshadowing. In an 
initial study, participants watched a video of a robbery carried out by a salient individual 
whom those assigned to the verbalization condition subsequently described (Schooler & 
Engstler-Schooler, 1990). Participants who described the robber were subsequently poorer at 
picking him out of a lineup, compared with control participants who read an unrelated text for 
the same amount of time. Detrimental effects of verbal descriptions have since been found for 
other visual stimuli such as abstract shapes (Brandimonte, Schooler, & Gabbino, 1997) and 
perceptual events (Huff & Schwan, 2008), as well as for other aspects of perceptual memory 
including recognition of colors, music, and voices (Chin & Schooler, 2008).  
Although verbal overshadowing can be reliably demonstrated for face recognition 
(Meissner & Brigham, 2001), the effect is not large and is now known to be reliant on 
particular features of the experiment. Under conditions that vary from those of the classical 
overshadowing paradigm (e.g., use of multiple faces rather than a single face, immediate 
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rather than delayed verbal description), verbalization can have the opposite effect of 
facilitating memory for faces (C. Brown & Lloyd-Jones, 2005; Meissner, Sporer, & Susa, 
2008). These varied effects of verbalization are discussed in detail in a special issue of the 
European Journal of Cognitive Psychology (Lloyd-Jones, Brandimonte, & Bäuml, 2008). 
For the purposes of this review, however, the main interest concerns those situations 
where verbally-influenced representations impair perceptual memory for the same stimulus. 
Two main explanations of this effect have been discussed (Chin & Schooler, 2008). The 
content or retrieval-process explanation proposes that the information generated by the verbal 
description is a poor match to the perceptual experience, and produces a deficient, verbally-
biased representation. This new representation interferes with retrieval of the perceptual 
representation required for accurate recognition but does not eradicate the original visual 
memory. Consistent with this, there is a small but significant association between the quality 
of the verbal description and subsequent recognition accuracy (Meissner, et al., 2008). 
Supporting the idea that the original memory retains intact, overshadowing effects can be 
attenuated by re-introducing visual cues present at encoding (Brandimonte, et al., 1997). 
 In some cases, however, verbalization of one stimulus has had detrimental effects on 
the recognition of other, non-described stimuli. This finding has led to an alternative 
explanation that contrasts a global/holistic/configural processing orientation, with a focus on 
the entire stimulus array and the relations between them, with a local/analytic/featural 
processing orientation in which the focus is on individual features. According to one version 
of this account, verbalization may under certain circumstances produce a switch to 
local/analytic processing, which then impedes performance on tasks, such as the recognition 
of complex perceptual events, that require more global processing (Chin & Schooler, 2008). 
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This explanation, known as the transfer-inappropriate processing shift account, has been 
supported by evidence that manipulations requiring participants to focus on the local features 
of unrelated stimuli tend to impair face recognition whereas a more global focus on the same 
stimuli improves recognition (Macrae & Lewis, 2002).  
Although no one explanation is likely to account for all verbal overshadowing effects, 
the retrieval process account emphasizing competing representations in memory is of 
particular interest for this article. The account has been applied not only to perceptual 
memory but to visuospatial memory. Investigators have studied how verbal overshadowing 
affects route finding versus configural knowledge applied to the same map (Fiore & Schooler, 
2002). Whereas route memory involves recalling a specific series of consecutive locations 
and can be based on egocentric spatial representations, configural knowledge involves 
recalling the relationship between elements in the whole scene and hence depends heavily on 
allocentric spatial representations (see previous section on Spatial priming and memory). 
Fiore and Schooler reported that, compared to controls, participants who were required to 
verbalize their knowledge of a route involving 16 landmarks were significantly impaired on a 
task involving configural knowledge. 
In a related study (Brandimonte & Collina, 2008), participants memorized line drawings 
which they were subsequently required to mentally rotate, enabling them to identify the letters 
that made up the drawing. Naming the line drawings at encoding led to a verbal 
overshadowing effect, but only when the names were provided by someone else. Names 
generated by participants themselves improved performance. Because performance depended 
on the specific nature of the verbal label, rather than on verbalization per se, the authors 
concluded that their findings supported a retrieval process over a transfer-inappropriate 
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processing account. A similar study (Walker, Blake, & Bremner, 2008) investigated the 
impact of naming on alternative visual object representations. Participants were briefly shown 
a novel object that they were asked to draw. Half were provided with a name (‘riff’ or ‘dax’) 
for the object and the other half were not given a name. The results showed that after a delay 
participants given a name for the object tended to draw it from an alternative viewpoint to the 
one they had originally seen, whereas without a name participants showed no such tendency. 
As in Brandimonte and Collina’s study where a name provided by someone else favored 
configural over featural representations, Walker et al. argued that naming favored access to 
the allocentric representation and reduced the accessibility of the egocentric representation. 
SenseCam Studies 
Recent work using new image capture technology has suggested that perceptual 
information can be stored for long periods in the absence of episodic recall. SenseCam is 
a small camera with sensors that is typically worn high on the chest and automatically 
takes pictures of the environment immediately in front of the wearer (i.e., from an 
egocentric viewpoint) (Hodges, Berry, & Wood, 2011). When pictures are taken is 
determined by a timing device and by change detected by the sensors, not by the 
intervention of the wearer. A fish-eye lens results in nearly everything in front of the 
camera being photographed. During the course of a day SenseCam may record several 
hundred images. In an early study it was found that a patient with severe episodic 
memory impairment consequent on limbic encephalitis was, after viewing the 
corresponding SenseCam images, able to report apparently normal recall of 80% of 
recently experienced events, significantly more than when using a written diary. The 
images were reported to trigger occurrences, thoughts, and feelings associated with the 
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episode but not contained in the images. The patient retained a high level of recall over 
11 months, despite not having reviewed the images in the final three months (Berry et al., 
2007). Similar improvements in recall have been reported in another patient with severe 
memory problems (Loveday & Conway, 2011). 
A subsequent neuroimaging study with the patient studied by Berry et al. 
investigated neural responses to SenseCam images of an event that had been rehearsed by 
repeated viewing of the images versus another event that had been rehearsed using a 
written diary (Berry et al., 2009). Repeated image viewing led to superior recognition 
relative to the written condition and in the fMRI scanner the corresponding images were 
accompanied by increased activation in prefrontal, posterior temporal, parietal, and 
occipital areas, but not the hippocampus. The authors concluded that SenseCam may aid 
memory by providing a bottom-up replacement for the medial temporal lobes, and 
suggested that the images constitute such a powerful retrieval cue that reviewing them is 
sufficient to consolidate the events in a long-term memory store. 
Preliminary data suggest that healthy participants are very successful at 
discriminating their own SenseCam images from those of others over periods as long as 
four months, and that a proportion of them can lead to full recollection of the original 
situation (Sellen et al., 2007). Interestingly, images automatically recorded by SenseCam 
provided better cues to subsequent recall than images participants had taken deliberately 
using the same camera. The results support previous evidence for the existence of a long-
term, consciously accessible memory store that provides a repository for automatically 
encoded perceptual information.  
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Summary 
  
It is now clear that verbalization can have a variety of effects depending on the 
experimental design and the nature of the verbalization. Under some conditions, however, 
verbalization does consistently lead to impairment of perceptual memory for the same 
stimulus. Although there is unlikely to be a single explanation for this effect, both the main 
theoretical approaches to verbal overshadowing are compatible with the idea of competition 
between multiple memory systems and representations (Meissner, et al., 2008). Furthermore, 
under conditions in which access to episodic memories is compromised, studies using 
SenseCam support the proposal that there is an alternative long-term store of consciously 
experienced visual memories (M. A. Conway, 2009). To date, however, the evidence that 
long-lasting perceptual representations may be automatically encoded and be functionally 
distinct from verbal representations is limited. The claims made by clinical theories of PTSD 
and other trauma-related disorders, namely that these two forms of representation are 
differentially affected by extreme stress, are therefore of considerable importance for general 
theories of memory. If correct, they have implications that go beyond the understanding of 
one particular clinical disorder. 
 
Perceptual and Episodic Memory in PTSD 
Psychological Theories of PTSD 
 
According to several clinical accounts of PTSD (Brewin, Dalgleish, et al., 1996; Ehlers 
& Clark, 2000; Foa & Rothbaum, 1998; Freyd, 1996; Terr, 1991) the disorder is characterized 
by two very distinct effects relating to memory for the traumatic event, both part of current 
diagnostic criteria in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric 
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Association (DSM-IV-TR: American Psychiatric Association, 2000). On the one hand there 
are frequent and intense involuntary memories consisting of trauma-related images (symptom 
B3: “acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were recurring”) that are experienced in the 
present (so-called “flashbacks”). On the other hand voluntary recall of the traumatic memory 
tends to be effortful, fragmented, and disorganized (symptom C3: “inability to recall an 
important aspect of the trauma”). This symptom refers to patients’ experience of gaps or 
discontinuities in their memory of the event and does not imply amnesia for the fact of the 
event having occurred. The theories all imply that a dissociation between perceptual and 
episodic memory for the trauma is at the heart of the condition. 
Although most posttraumatic symptoms are common to a number of disorders, 
flashbacks are only mentioned in the context of PTSD and a closely related condition, 
acute stress disorder (ASD) (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Flashbacks are 
part of the PTSD re-experiencing symptom cluster within DSM-IV-TR and typically 
consist of a vivid, detailed multi-sensory image, usually visual but not necessarily so. For 
example, they may include somatosensory re-experiencing of heat, cold, or pain that 
accompanied the trauma (Whalley, Farmer, & Brewin, 2007). They tend to consist of 
fragmented snapshots or series of images, come to mind involuntarily, and are 
experienced as happening again in the present (Brewin, 2007; Ehlers, Hackmann, & 
Michael, 2004). Although there are no official or generally accepted definitions of a 
flashback, the description introduced in DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013) offers clarification by stating that they can vary from relatively mild (there is a 
transient sense of the event reoccurring in the present) to extreme (the person loses all 
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connection with their current autobiographical self and present surroundings while 
reexperiencing the memory).  
A detailed theoretical account of flashbacks is provided by the dual representation 
theory of PTSD. According to the initial version of the theory (Brewin, Dalgleish, et al., 
1996), flashbacks are the product of long-term image-based (perceptual) representations that 
were rapidly captured during the trauma, required minimal conscious attention to encode, and 
can subsequently only be accessed automatically (‘situationally accessible memory’ or SAM). 
These co-exist with other trauma representations that reflect more conscious attention at 
encoding, resulting in them being voluntarily accessible, verbalizable, and able to interact 
with other information in autobiographical memory (‘verbally accessible memory’ or VAM). 
The capture of sensory images by the SAM system is seen as a functional response to the 
down-regulation of the episodic memory system under extreme stress (Jacobs & Nadel, 1985; 
Metcalfe & Jacobs, 1998), allowing a large quantity of survival-related information to be 
encoded and stored for long periods even though conscious attention may be more narrowly 
focused on the source of threat.  
According to this approach flashbacks initially reflect an adaptive response that is part 
of the recovery process; when automatically triggered by trauma reminders such as sensory 
cues, the allocation of conscious attention to the content of these images allows detailed 
perceptual information to be re-encoded into episodic memory where it can be made verbally 
accessible and assigned a temporal and spatial context. Once provided with this context, 
sensory cues no longer signal a current source of danger and as a result flashbacks become 
progressively weaker and less frequent. The theory proposed that the involuntary retrieval and 
reliving of threat-related images is more likely under two conditions: when encoding of the 
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event into the SAM system is unimpeded or enhanced, and when encoding or re-encoding 
into the VAM system is in some way degraded or reduced. PTSD results when individuals 
cannot tolerate reexperiencing of the traumatic images, such that re-encoding into episodic 
memory is never achieved and flashbacks remain intense and persistent. 
Three main claims differentiate dual representation theory from other standard models 
of memory. The first is that involuntary memories of a trauma scene can be weakened by 
carrying out a secondary task at the same time as the images are encoded, but that this can 
only be accomplished by a task that competes for perceptual resources. In contrast, a task that 
competes for verbal resources will strengthen subsequent involuntary memories of the trauma 
scene. The second claim, shared with Ehlers and Clark (2000), is that the degree of voluntary 
explicit memory (recall and recognition) for a trauma scene should be unrelated, or if 
anything inversely related, to the degree of involuntary memory for that scene, supporting 
their functional independence. The third claim is that the determinants and characteristics of 
involuntary trauma images (perceptual experiences) are different to those of involuntary 
thoughts (verbal experiences such as “Why did this event happen to me?”) for the same 
material.  
According to Ehlers and Clark (2000), during a trauma strong associations are formed 
that result in perceptual priming and help the person to make (sometimes preconscious) 
predictions about future sources of danger. Using a distinction that has been influential in 
cognitive psychology (Roediger & McDermott, 1993), they proposed that this process is 
enhanced by relatively strong data-driven processing focused on sensory impressions, and by 
relatively weak conceptual processing focused on the meaning of the situation, organizing the 
information, and placing it in context. Ehlers and Clark also noted that the retrieval of 
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flashbacks from associative memory is cue-driven and unintentional, so that the person may 
be unaware of the triggers for reexperiencing.  
Difficulty in recalling important aspects of the trauma is a separate symptom that forms 
part of the avoidance and numbing cluster in DSM-IV-TR. According to Foa and Rothbaum 
(1998), the emotional intensity of the event disrupts the cognitive processes of attention and 
memory at the time of encoding, leading to the formation of a disjointed and fragmented 
representation in memory and to trauma narratives that are relatively brief, simplistic, and 
poorly articulated. Repeated reliving in therapy generates a more organized memory record 
that is easier to integrate with the rest of the memory system. Similarly, Ehlers and Clark 
(2000) proposed that the memory of the trauma is poorly elaborated and inadequately 
integrated into the general database of autobiographical 
knowledge, partly as a result of the difficulty in conceptually processing the events. The 
absence of clearly specified retrieval routes is one factor that accounts for the difficulty in 
intentional recall.  
 Despite general acceptance that high levels of emotion can impair eyewitness 
testimony (Kassin, Ellsworth, & Smith, 1989) and that the effects of emotion on memory are 
complex (Christianson, 1992; Reisberg & Heuer, 1992), the claim that voluntary memory is 
fragmented and disorganized in PTSD has been frequently disputed (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; 
McNally, 2003, 2005; Porter & Birt, 2001; Rubin, Berntsen, et al., 2008; Shobe & Kihlstrom, 
1997) and remains controversial. For example, Berntsen and Rubin (2006, p. 222) stated: 
“Clinical case studies and observations have indicated that traumatic memories are 
fragmented and lack narrative coherence as compared to other memories both with respect to 
the narrative coherence of the trauma memory when viewed in isolation and with respect to 
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the integration of the trauma memory into the overall life story and self-schema of the 
person…However, both claims have found little support when subjected to more systematic 
experimental examination”. 
One issue is that the initial clinical observations (Foa, Molnar, & Cashman, 1995; van 
Minnen, Wessel, Dijkstra, & Roelofs, 2002) were unsupported by proper controlled 
comparisons with similar individuals not suffering from PTSD. Further, it was pointed out 
that PTSD might be associated with similar deficits in neutral or even in positive memories 
and hence be unrelated specifically to trauma (McNally, 2003). The accretion of empirical 
data has now yielded a substantial evidence base that addresses this issue (see Voluntary 
Episodic Memory in PTSD). In contrast, there has been much more widespread agreement 
that PTSD is associated with the involuntary intrusion of vivid memories containing large 
quantities of sensory detail, and these studies are more briefly reviewed.  
 
Involuntary Perceptual Memory in PTSD 
 Phenomenological descriptions of involuntary memories reported by PTSD 
patients have consistently described them as being brief and perceptually detailed (Ehlers 
& Steil, 1995; Mellman & Davis, 1985; van der Kolk & Fisler, 1995), with visual details 
predominating (Ehlers et al., 2002; Ehlers & Steil, 1995; Hackmann, et al., 2004). 
Although involuntary memories are an essentially normal phenomenon (Brewin, 
Christodoulides, & Hutchinson, 1996), what distinguishes those occurring in PTSD is 
that they typically involve a small number of traumatic scenes that are repeatedly 
reexperienced (Brewin, et al., 2010). They are also distinct from ruminative thoughts in 
being briefer and containing more sensory elements (Speckens, Ehlers, Hackmann, 
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Ruths, & Clark, 2007). Individuals with PTSD describe more sensory details in their 
trauma memories than in their non-trauma memories (Rubin, Feldman, & Beckham, 
2004). One exception to the above was the finding that Croatian war veterans did not 
report more sensory features in their trauma memories than in a neutral memory 
(Geraerts et al., 2007). In this case, however, the opportunity to indicate these sensory 
features was limited to a Yes or No answer, a format which may have been insufficiently 
sensitive to detect differences. 
 In one study flashbacks and ordinary episodic memories of trauma reported by 
PTSD patients were directly compared. Patients were required to write a detailed trauma 
narrative and indicate which words and sentences had spontaneously elicited flashbacks. 
Those sections that were associated with flashbacks were found to contain more 
perceptual details and mentions of motion (Hellawell & Brewin, 2004). Writing sections 
that elicited flashbacks also produced more interference with a subsequent visuospatial 
task than did writing non-flashback sections, supporting the prediction that they would 
involve more use of perceptual processing resources. In contrast, there was no differential 
interference with a subsequent verbal task (Hellawell & Brewin, 2002). 
 Another characteristic of involuntary memories in PTSD is the sense of ‘nowness’ 
whereby they are experienced as though they are occurring in the present. This subjective 
lack of past temporal context (Ehlers, et al., 2004) decreases with successful treatment 
(Hackmann, et al., 2004; Speckens, et al., 2006). The trauma memories of individuals 
with PTSD are more strongly characterized by this feature than their non-trauma 
memories (Rubin, et al., 2004), and the sense of ‘nowness’ also distinguishes involuntary 
memories in PTSD from the involuntary memories reported by depressed patients or 
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individuals who were exposed to trauma without developing PTSD (Berntsen, Willert, & 
Rubin, 2003; Birrer, Michael, & Munsch, 2007; Reynolds & Brewin, 1998).  
 Memories with these same qualities of enhanced perceptual features and sense of 
‘nowness’ also characterize children with posttraumatic conditions (McKinnon, Nixon, & 
Brewer, 2008; Meiser-Stedman, Dalgleish, Smith, Yule, & Glucksman, 2007). 
Importantly, empirical studies confirm that flashbacks appear to be a specific indicator of 
PTSD (Bryant, et al., 2011), and the sense of ‘nowness’ is predictive of the course of the 
disorder over and above the effects of initial symptom levels (Kleim, Ehlers, & 
Glucksman, 2007; Michael, Ehlers, Halligan, & Clark, 2005).  
Perceptual Priming and Involuntary Images 
 Earlier evidence that perceptual priming for trauma-related words is enhanced for 
people with PTSD compared to those without PTSD was mixed (Amir, McNally, & 
Wiegartz, 1996; Golier, Yehuda, Lupien, & Harvey, 2003; McNally & Amir, 1996). 
However, two recent studies employing a word-stem completion task found that the 
degree of priming for trauma-related words assessed in survivors post-trauma predicted 
the subsequent development of symptoms (Ehring & Ehlers, 2011; Michael, Ehlers, & 
Halligan, 2005). Michael et al. showed that at eight weeks post-trauma the degree of 
priming was significantly greater in assault survivors with PTSD than those without 
PTSD. In the study by Ehring and Ehlers the degree of priming at two weeks post-trauma 
predicted PTSD symptoms in motor vehicle accident victims six months later, even when 
levels of initial symptoms and priming for other words were controlled. Although the 
word-stem completion task is usually regarded as a measure of perceptual priming, 
Ehring and Ehlers noted that a contribution to the overall effect made by conceptual 
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priming could not be ruled out. A recent study is of particular interest in this regard, as it 
employed both the word-stem completion test and an unambiguous measure of 
conceptual priming, a word-cue association task (Lyttle, Dorahy, Hanna, & Huntjens, 
2010). Relative to healthy controls exposed to trauma, PTSD patients showed 
significantly greater priming to trauma-related words on the word-stem completion task 
but significantly less conceptual priming. Perceptual priming was additionally correlated 
with reporting higher levels of state dissociation.  
 Among the limitations noted by these authors are that the type of post-trauma 
priming assessed here is different from the perceptual priming that is hypothesized to 
take place during exposure to the traumatic event. In a series of studies with healthy 
volunteers, however, Ehlers, Michael, and their colleagues have studied priming for 
neutral objects that are embedded within traumatic versus neutral picture stories. 
Consistent with research by Arntz et al. (2005), they showed that objects that preceded 
traumatic pictures were more strongly primed than those preceding neutral pictures, as 
assessed by a blurred picture identification task (Ehlers, Michael, Chen, Payne, & Shan, 
2006). Moreover, stronger perceptual priming predicted more involuntary intrusion of 
viewed pictures over the next three months.  
 These results were subsequently replicated (Michael & Ehlers, 2007; Sündermann, 
Hauschildt, & Ehlers, 2013), Sündermann et al. finding that the effects of priming could not 
be accounted for by explicit memory for the primed objects. Michael and Ehlers, but not 
Sündermann et al., additionally showed that greater state dissociation (e.g., feeling the world 
was unreal, alterations in the experience of self, speeding or slowing of subjective time) 
during exposure to the traumatic stories was related to stronger perceptual priming for those 
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stories. In a second experiment Michael and Ehlers had some of their participants elaborate 
their memory for their stories by asking them a series of questions about their experience of 
the study and about the story materials they had viewed. A control group conducted verbal 
tasks that were not related to the story content. Michael and Ehlers found that the elaboration 
group demonstrated significantly less perceptual priming for the trauma stories and fewer 
subsequent intrusions of images from the stories than did the group performing unrelated 
verbal tasks, a result that may be related to the phenomenon of unpriming (Sparrow & 
Wegner, 2006).  
In the absence of a third group who were not given any task, however, it is not possible 
to determine whether Michael and Ehlers’s results reflected a reduction in intrusions caused 
by verbal elaboration, an increase in intrusions caused by the unrelated verbal task, or both. 
Subsequent research (Ehlers, Mauchnik, & Handley, 2012) has confirmed that memory 
elaboration has an effect on priming and is associated with a reduction in subsequent 
intrusive memories, although in this investigation elaboration increased priming of 
stimuli associated with neutral material rather than decreasing priming of stimuli 
associated with traumatic material. 
 Although these striking findings are supportive of an alteration in perceptual 
processing associated with PTSD, and suggest this may be related to the development of 
some symptoms of the disorder, it has not yet been possible to show that there is 
enhanced priming for stimuli present during an actual traumatic exposure. 
 
Voluntary Episodic Memory in PTSD 
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 In view of the controversy over this question a search was conducted of all 
controlled studies of memory disorganization or fragmentation in ASD or PTSD.  The 
inclusion criteria were as follows: Studies were required either to report data from 
clinical (PTSD, ASD) and non-clinical samples on indices of fragmentation or 
disorganization of a voluntarily recalled traumatic memory, or to report data from a 
clinical sample on indices of fragmentation or disorganization of voluntarily recalled 
traumatic and non-traumatic memories. Studies using computerized methods designed for 
other purposes to assess disorganization (e.g., Flesch reading formulas designed to gauge 
narrative complexity and articulation) were excluded as their validity in this context is 
highly questionable (Gray & Lombardo, 2001). Details of the resulting nine studies 
reported in eight articles are shown in Table 1. The table reports the following 
information: sample size and gender composition; the nature of the groups studied; the 
material used; the way in which fragmentation or disorganization were measured; and the 
main findings. Findings are expressed as the presence or absence of group differences, 
stimulus differences, or interactions between group and stimulus, accompanied by the 
level of statistical significance.  
The studies can be divided into those that required participants to produce a 
detailed narrative that was then rated by independent judges, and those that used 
questionnaire measures. The table shows that all six studies using judge ratings of 
narratives were consistent in showing greater disorganization or fragmentation in the 
trauma memories of adults and children with ASD or PTSD than in healthy controls, 
some of these differences being highly significant (Halligan, Michael, Clark, & Ehlers, 
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2003; Harvey & Bryant, 1999; Jelinek, Randjbar, Seifert, Kellner, & Moritz, 2009; Jones, 
Harvey, & Brewin, 2007; Kenardy et al., 2007; Salmond et al., 2011).  
 In contrast, the results using self-reported questionnaire ratings were more 
variable with two studies (Halligan et al., 2003, studies 1 and 2) showing similar 
significant effects and two studies (Berntsen, et al., 2003; Jelinek, et al., 2009) showing 
no significant group differences. Of note, no study using any measure showed a healthy 
control group with significantly greater disorganization in their trauma memories. The 
only study not to show any evidence for a group difference in fragmentation or 
disorganization on any measure (Berntsen et al., 2003) relied on a single item. Berntsen 
et al. asked “When you recall the traumatic event, do you then think of it as a continuous 
series of episodes or as some isolated incoherent fragments?” In addition to the problems 
of low reliability with single-item measures that address complex concepts such as 
fragmentation or disorganization, the item does not distinguish between voluntary and 
involuntary recall of the trauma. Salmond et al. (2011) further noted that use of self-
report measures to characterize memory quality has been criticised because responses 
may be influenced by demand characteristics (Pasupathi, 2007) and may not correspond 
with actual memory performance (Kindt & van den Hout, 2003). 
 Four studies, three in adults and one in children, have addressed the question of 
whether individuals with ASD or PTSD have greater disorganization in their trauma 
memories but not in unpleasant, nontraumatic memories. As shown in Table 1, two 
studies using independent judge ratings (Jelinek, et al., 2009; Salmond, et al., 2011) and 
one using self–ratings (Halligan et al., 2003, study 2) found that disorganization was 
significantly more marked in the trauma memories;  similarly, one study found no 
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evidence of impaired sequence memory for non-autobiographical material (Jelinek, et al., 
2009). In a similar pattern to that shown for the between-group differences, the single 
study to show equivalent levels of disorganization within a PTSD sample for traumatic 
and non-traumatic events (Rubin, et al., 2004) used two single-item measures. 
 In other studies PTSD patients have been found to take longer to retrieve 
autobiographical memories when listening to a script of their traumatic event than to a 
script of another very distressing but non-traumatic event, suggesting that the traumatic 
event memory was less well integrated with other autobiographical material (Kleim, 
Wallott, & Ehlers, 2008). Finally, these impairments in voluntary trauma memory have 
frequently been found to predict the course of PTSD (Buck, Kindt, van den Hout, Steens, 
& Linders, 2007; Ehring, Ehlers, & Glucksman, 2008; Engelhard, van den Hout, Kindt, 
Arntz, & Schouten, 2003), in some cases over and above the effects of initial symptom 
levels (Halligan, et al., 2003; Jones, et al., 2007).  
 Shobe and Kihlstrom (1997) explicitly rejected the proposal that “memories of 
trauma, or at least of certain forms of trauma, are encoded by processes, such as 
repression and dissociation, that make them difficult to retrieve as coherent, verbal 
narratives” (p. 74). In contrast, Foa and Rothbaum (1998) proposed that higher levels of 
fragmentation and disorganization in trauma narratives are related to the occurrence of 
dissociative responses. Subsequent research has consistently found that higher levels of 
fragmentation in trauma narratives are related to self-reported dissociation either during 
or after the traumatic event (Engelhard, et al., 2003; Giesbrecht, Merckelbach, van 
Oorsouw, & Simeon, 2010; Halligan, et al., 2003; Harvey & Bryant, 1999; Murray, 
Ehlers, & Mayou, 2002; Rubin, et al., 2004). Two studies failed to find any correlation 
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between dissociation and objective indices of fragmentation but in both, unlike the 
previous investigations, exposure was to a trauma video in the laboratory and not to a 
personally experienced event (Kindt & van den Hout, 2003; Kindt, van den Hout, & 
Buck, 2005). More recent experimental studies have confirmed that inducing dissociation 
in the laboratory does appear to impair several aspects of memory (Brewin, Ma, & 
Colson, 2013; Brewin & Mersaditabari, 2013). 
 
Summary 
 A considerable amount of evidence now strongly favors the claims that in samples 
suffering from ASD or PTSD trauma memories are affected in two separate ways, with 
enhanced perceptual features and a sense of ‘nowness’ accompanying involuntary recall, and 
fragmentation or disorganization accompanying voluntary recall. Although these qualities of 
involuntary memory in PTSD are generally accepted, recent evidence has specifically 
implicated perceptual priming in the development of this symptom. Controversy over the 
presence of disorganization appears likely to be attributable to the use of different types of 
measurement, with more rigorous, independent measures yielding consistent findings and 
briefer, self-report measures yielding less consistent findings. Importantly, both of these 
distinct effects on memory are predictive of the course of the disorder, suggesting a possible 
causal role in psychopathology. Further, in agreement with clinical models, fragmentation and 
disorganization are related to reports of dissociative reactions occurring at the time of the 
trauma. Studies have yet to properly identify the exact nature of the disorganization, however, 
for example distinguishing between narrative cohesion (the connectedness of the elements) 
and narrative coherence (its overall conceptual organization) (O'Kearney & Perrott, 2006).  
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Trauma-Related Research on Interactions Involving Perceptual and Episodic Memory 
Involuntary Recall and the Modality of Competing Tasks at or after Encoding 
Consistent with the hypothesis of functional independence between perceptual and 
episodic memory systems, a number of studies have tested the claim made by dual 
representation theory (Brewin, Dalgleish, et al., 1996) that concurrent visuospatial tasks at 
trauma exposure would reduce subsequent intrusions whereas concurrent verbal tasks would 
increase subsequent intrusions (see Psychological Theories of PTSD). The assumption has 
been that visuospatial tasks are particularly likely to interfere with perceptual, image-based 
representations. In order to test this it has been necessary to utilize an analogue design in 
which healthy volunteers are shown a film containing traumatic scenes. To replicate traumatic 
conditions and engage participants as fully as possible, most studies have used real-life 
footage together with a brief commentary about the individuals involved. While watching the 
film participants either perform a concurrent visuospatial task such as pattern tapping or a 
verbal task such as counting backwards in threes. They subsequently record images of the 
film that come unbidden into their minds over the next 1-2 weeks. A search was therefore 
conducted to identify controlled studies meeting the following inclusion criteria: Participants 
were shown a trauma film and carried out either a verbal or a perceptual concurrent task; there 
was a control no-task condition; involuntary memories were assessed over a period of at least 
48 hours. The studies previously located for the review of memory quality in PTSD were 
screened, along with studies identified in a previous review (Holmes & Bourne, 2008), 
yielding a total of 18 studies described in 13 separate articles. 
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Table 2 presents the following information concerning the 18 studies: the number of 
participants and their gender composition; the film content (real-life or fiction), structure, 
length, and modality; the secondary tasks employed; the timing of the tasks; voluntary 
memory for the film in the different conditions (mean cued recall or recognition scores, 
standard deviations); and involuntary memory for the film in the different conditions (time 
period, mean number of occasions memories were reported, standard deviations). The 
voluntary recall data are relevant to the next section (Relation of Voluntary Episodic Recall to 
Involuntary Intrusion of Images). Significant differences between means are indicated by the 
presence of different subscripts. As shown in Table 2, the studies used several perceptual 
concurrent tasks that primarily involved a visuospatial component, including pattern tapping, 
making shapes out of plasticine, and the computer game Tetris. The most common task 
involved tapping a memorized sequence of keys on a keyboard. Verbal tasks included 
counting backwards and the computer game Pub Quiz. Some studies included a verbal 
enhancement condition, designed to reduce intrusions, in which participants attempted to 
describe the trauma film in words as they watched it. 
The results consistently demonstrated that a concurrent visuospatial task reduced the 
subsequent involuntary recall of images of the film over the following week, relative to a no-
task condition (Bourne, Frasquilho, Roth, & Holmes, 2010; Brewin & Saunders, 2001; 
Holmes, Brewin, & Hennessy, 2004; Krans, Näring, Holmes, & Becker, 2010a, 2010b; Stuart, 
Holmes, & Brewin, 2006). In a single study the effect was in the same direction but 
nonsignificant, although the visuospatial task did significantly reduce intrusions during the 
day of the film for high-anxious participants (Logan & O'Kearney, 2012). The effects of 
pattern tapping on reducing intrusions do not appear to be solely due to the movement 
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component of the task, as a comparable task involving movement without a visuospatial 
element (a complex gum-chewing task in which the gum had to be moved systematically 
round the mouth) did not reduce intrusions (Krans, et al., 2010b). Later studies indicated that 
visuospatial tasks still reduce involuntary images when administered up to four hours post-
encoding (Holmes, James, Coode-Bate, & Deeprose, 2009; Holmes, James, Kilford, & 
Deeprose, 2010). Overall, 13 out of 13 studies demonstrated a numerical group difference in 
the predicted direction (p < .001 by sign test). 
The effects of concurrent verbal tasks were more varied. In the first study Holmes et al. 
(2004, exp. 3) showed that counting backwards in 3s while watching the trauma film led to a 
significant increase in intrusive images relative to a control condition. Several authors have 
attempted to directly replicate this finding employing as their task counting backwards in 
threes or sevens (Bourne, et al., 2010; Deeprose, Zhang, DeJong, Dalgleish, & Holmes, 2012; 
Krans, Näring, & Becker, 2009; Logan & O'Kearney, 2012). This procedure significantly 
increased intrusions of a trauma film relative to a no-task control condition in one study 
(Bourne et al., 2010, exp. 2), showed a nonsignificant trend in the same direction in three 
studies (Bourne et al., 2010, exp. 1; Deeprose et al., 2012, exps. 1 and 2), and showed a 
nonsignificant trend in the opposite direction in two studies (Krans et al., 2009; Logan & 
O’Kearney, 2012). Bourne et al. (2010, exp. 1) found that the better participants performed 
the counting task, the more intrusions they developed. Combining the results of these seven 
studies on 207 participants meta-analytically (Bax, Yu, Ikeda, Tsuruta, & Moons, 2006), 
employing Hedges’ g as a measure of effect size and applying a random effects model, 
yielded a highly significant effect, z = 8.08, p < .001.  
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Five other studies carried out conceptual replications employing alternative verbal 
concurrent tasks, including remembering a 9-digit number (Nixon, Cain, Nehmy, & Seymour, 
2009; Nixon, Nehmy, & Seymour, 2007), simple counting from 1 to 6 (Krans et al., 2010a), 
or the computer game Pub Quiz (Holmes et al., 2010, exps. 1 and 2). The verbal tasks 
significantly increased intrusions of a trauma film relative to a no-task control condition in 
one study (Holmes et al., 2010, exp. 1), were not significantly different in three studies 
(Holmes et al., 2010, exp. 2; Nixon et al., 2007, 2009), and showed a significant effect in the 
opposite direction in one study (Krans et al., 2010a). A similar meta-analysis of the results of 
these five studies on 232 participants yielded a nonsignificant effect, z = 0.42, p > .60.  
Unlike the consistent results with spatial tasks, the findings with verbal tasks suggest 
that the nature of the task is critical. Counting backwards continuously in 3s or 7s appears to 
reliably increase intrusions relative to a control condition, but the task parameters driving this 
effect remain to be determined. Among the possibilities why alternative tasks were ineffective 
are that they were not continuous (e.g., remembering a 9-digit number), that they were 
insufficiently demanding (e.g., simple counting from 1 to 6), or that the effects are hard to 
obtain when they are administered several hours after the trauma film (e.g., Pub Quiz). 
As shown in Table 2, there have been several attempts to enhance verbal processing 
during exposure to a trauma film, for example by having participants attempt to put into 
words what they were seeing on the screen. In two experiments using this method the number 
of subsequent intrusions did not differ from those reported by participants in a no-task control 
condition (Holmes, et al., 2004; Krans, Näring, & Becker, 2009). One of the problems with 
this method is that participants are often unable to fully comply with the task and 
verbalization is interrupted when unexpected or shocking images are shown. 
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Relation of Voluntary Episodic Recall to Involuntary Intrusion of Images 
Several studies have reported data that permit an assessment of the claim (Brewin, 
Dalgleish, et al., 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000) that voluntary episodic memory and involuntary 
perceptual memory for the same traumatic materials are unrelated, or even negatively 
associated (see Psychological Theories of PTSD). Other studies reported similar data on 
negative but not necessarily traumatic materials. A further search was therefore conducted to 
identify controlled studies meeting the following inclusion criteria: Participants were shown 
stimulus materials at least some of which were negatively valenced; recall or recognition was 
tested for the materials; the occurrence of involuntary images was assessed over a period of at 
least 48 hours; the data reported allowed for a quantitative estimate of the association between 
voluntary recall and the intrusion of images. Two sorts of study were found: Correlational 
studies, summarized in Table 3, and experimental studies, summarized in Table 4. The studies 
previously located for the review of memory quality in PTSD were screened, yielding a total 
of 25 studies described in 21 separate articles. Tables 3 and 4 present the following 
information concerning those studies not already described in Table 2: The number of 
participants and their gender composition; the experimental stimuli employed; the measures 
of voluntary and involuntary recall; the design of the study; and the association between 
voluntary and involuntary recall.  
 Eleven of the studies showing traumatic material to healthy volunteers correlated the 
number of images involuntarily recalled over the succeeding week with measures of explicit 
recall and recognition of the same material. As shown in Table 3, the majority of studies 
failed to find any significant association between them (Brewin & Saunders, 2001; 
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Hagenaars, van Minnen, Holmes, Brewin, & Hoogduin, 2008; Holmes, et al., 2004; Krans, et 
al., 2010b; Nixon, et al., 2009; Sündermann, et al., 2013), with one study reporting a 
significant negative correlation (Michael & Ehlers, 2007, Expt. 2) and two reporting 
significant positive correlations (Ferree & Cahill, 2009; Ferree, Kamat, & Cahill, 2011). Eight 
studies in Table 3 involving a total of 444 participants reported actual correlation sizes and 
these were combined meta-analytically (Field, 2001; Hunter & Schmidt, 1990). Where more 
than one effect was reported separately within a single study, their average was used. This 
yielded an average r = .02, which did not differ significantly from zero, z = .29, p > .70. 
  As already noted, two of the studies in Table 3 carried out by the same research group 
reported that more intrusions of brief emotional film clips were significantly associated with 
greater voluntary recall of details (Ferree & Cahill, 2009; Ferree, et al., 2011). These 
investigations used a short time period (48 hours), and were the only ones to have relied on an 
overall retrospective rating of involuntary memory rather than the contemporaneous diary 
method used by the other studies reviewed. The procedure involved participants voluntarily 
recalling some details, such as what films they remembered seeing, how well they 
remembered them, and in what order they were shown. Only then did they indicate how many 
involuntary intrusions they had experienced. As such, although Ferree and colleagues tried to 
reduce demand effects by randomizing the order in which participants rated the intrusiveness 
of each film, there may have been more scope for the subjective estimates to be influenced by 
prior voluntary memory activity. 
The estimates generated by meta-analytically combining the correlation coefficients in 
Table 3 should be treated with caution given the small number of studies. However, the 
results are consistent with other studies that after an experimental manipulation reported 
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group differences in involuntary and voluntary memory separately but did not correlate them. 
The great majority of those studies that found significant group differences in involuntary 
memory did not report any corresponding significant differences in measures of recall or 
recognition. Some of these studies appear in Table 2 (Bourne et al., 2010, exp. 1; Holmes et 
al., 2009; Holmes et al., 2010, exps. 1 and 2; Krans et al., 2010a) with additional studies being 
shown in Table 4 (Ehlers, et al., 2012; Pearson, 2012; Pearson, Ross, & Webster, 2012). 
 Of particular interest are studies that included an intervention successfully producing 
significant changes in the strength of voluntary memory and that also investigated the effect 
on subsequent intrusions. In addition to one study shown in Table 2 (Bourne et al., 2010, exp. 
2), four additional studies are included in Table 4. For example, after watching a traumatic 
film participants were given a recognition test for details contained in some scenes but not 
others (Krans, Näring, Holmes, & Becker, 2009). The authors found that the recognition 
procedure led to significantly better recall on a final test, but to significantly decreased 
involuntary memories from those scenes over the next week. In another study imaginal 
rescripting of a trauma film, relative to employing positive imagery unrelated to the film, led 
to significantly better cued recall but to significantly fewer intrusive images (Hagenaars & 
Arntz, 2012). Two other studies reported that increasing levels of alcohol reduced voluntary 
memory in a linear fashion, whereas the relationship with involuntary memory was U-shaped, 
low levels of alcohol being associated with increased intrusions relative to no alcohol and 
high levels of alcohol (Bisby, Brewin, Leitz, & Curran, 2009; Bisby, King, Brewin, Burgess, 
& Curran, 2010). Thus all five studies that successfully manipulated the strength of voluntary 
memory found a significantly different type of effect on the frequency of involuntary images. 
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Independence of Involuntary Images and Involuntary Thoughts  
 The third claim made by dual representation theory is that the determinants and 
characteristics of involuntary images and involuntary thoughts are different (see 
Psychological Theories of PTSD). Few studies have separately analyzed the occurrence of 
involuntary images and thoughts for the same material within the same study, however. In the 
investigation (see Perceptual Priming and Involuntary Images) by Michael and Ehlers (2007, 
Expt. 2), the authors found a significant interaction between condition and intrusion content: 
The elaboration condition was associated with significantly fewer involuntary images from 
the picture stories than the control condition, but there was no corresponding effect on 
involuntary thoughts. Further analyses on the study by Hagenaars et al. (2008) described in 
Table 3 revealed a similar condition by intrusion content interaction (Hagenaars, Brewin, van 
Minnen, Holmes, & Hoogduin, 2010): Participants in a condition where they were not free to 
move reported significantly more involuntary images from the trauma film than the control 
condition, but a reduction in the frequency of involuntary thoughts. Greater anxiety, horror, 
and anger while watching the film were positively related to the frequency of involuntary 
images but not to involuntary thoughts. This finding is consistent with evidence that imagery 
is more strongly related to emotion than is verbal material (Holmes & Mathews, 2005). In a 
second experiment, Hagenaars et al. (2010) demonstrated that a traumatic film, relative to a 
neutral film, was associated with an increased frequency of involuntary images but not of 
involuntary thoughts. Once again levels of anxiety and horror while watching the films were 
related to the number of subsequent involuntary images but not to involuntary thoughts. 
 
Summary 
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 There is now a rapidly growing body of knowledge which allows a number of 
perhaps surprising conclusions to be drawn: Engaging in visuospatial tasks at or shortly 
after trauma encoding appears to block the development of involuntary images, whereas 
engaging in a verbal task that specifically involves counting backwards leads to more 
involuntary images; the extent of voluntary recall and the number of involuntary images 
of the same traumatic materials appear to be functionally independent; and involuntary 
images and thoughts about the same traumatic stimuli appear to have distinct 
characteristics. These data are very largely based on viewing of trauma films and the 
effects may not be observed with other stimuli such as briefly-presented affective 
pictures. For example, both a visuospatial and a verbal secondary task were found to 
reduce the intrusion of positively and negatively valenced pictures that had been 
presented to participants for one second each (Pearson & Sawyer, 2011). Although this 
study did not use the counting backwards task that is associated with more numerous 
intrusions of trauma films, their finding raises the possibility that more prolonged 
exposure to traumatic materials is needed to engage the processes that underlie the 
differential effects of visuospatial and verbal interference. For example, the rapid 
presentation of stimuli that have no specific personal meaning may make it unlikely that 
dissociation, a typical response to traumatic situations, will occur. Just as verbalization 
was found to have a variety of effects on verbal overshadowing, verbal tasks other than 
counting backwards have had variable effects on intrusive memory development. With 
this caveat, the findings reviewed in this section are broadly supportive of clinical 
theories of PTSD but are inconsistent with many standard memory theories that do not 
discriminate perceptual and episodic memory. 
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Reflections on the Controversy Concerning Memory Impairment in PTSD 
 Given what is the now very substantial empirical evidence for both enhanced 
involuntary perceptual memory and impaired voluntary episodic memory in PTSD, it is 
important to understand why the area has attracted such an extreme degree of 
controversy, and how even very recently researchers could state (Peace, Porter, & ten 
Brinke, 2008): “A range of perspectives have been applied to understanding the impact of 
trauma on memory, from the traditional clinical argument that trauma impairs memory 
for the event to the increasingly supported scientific view that memory is facilitated by 
trauma” (p. 10). Four possible explanations are discussed for the controversy in this area: 
First, the equating of processes in clinical and non-clinical samples; second, the influence 
of the recovered memory controversy; third, the equating of the semantic and episodic 
components of voluntary memory for the trauma; and fourth, the partial application of 
biological findings concerning emotion and memory. 
 
Equating Clinical and Non-clinical Samples  
A much-cited article in the debate has been that of Shobe and Kihlstrom (1997) 
who identified what they termed a ‘trauma-memory argument’. They identified clinical 
theorists who supposedly argued that traumatic memories had ‘special properties’ that 
distinguished them from memories routinely studied in the laboratory. Shobe and 
Kihlstrom rejected the idea that narrative memories of trauma might be impaired, citing 
evidence that they were more likely to be distinctive, long-lasting, and easily retrieved. 
The article did not distinguish, however, between the memories of individuals with 
                                                          Episodic Memory, Perceptual Memory and PTSD 
                                                                                                                                       48 
 
disorders such as PTSD, who were the focus of the clinical theorists, and the trauma 
memories of healthy or trauma-resilient individuals, who were not explicitly considered 
by these theorists.  
 This use of the ‘trauma-memory argument’ with its extrapolation of the clinical 
theories’ claims to all trauma memories, even in healthy samples, has been widely 
promulgated (Geraerts, et al., 2007; Porter & Birt, 2001; Rubin, Berntsen, et al., 2008), 
and is clearly manifest in the immediately preceding quotation from Peace et al. (2008). 
Of course, clinical and nonclinical groups do share a number of characteristics. For 
example, as shown by the trauma film studies both groups tend to respond to traumatic 
events with increased involuntary memories. On the other hand there is little evidence 
that the qualities of voluntary trauma and non-trauma memories differ in healthy samples 
(Brewin, 2007).  
 This indicates that considerable caution is needed when testing claims developed 
in the context of clinical samples by doing studies with healthy samples: For example, it 
may be inadvisable to conclude that clinical theories are mistaken because no evidence is 
found for greater fragmentation in the trauma than the non-trauma memories of healthy 
or mildly symptomatic participants (Porter & Birt, 2001; Rubin, Boals, & Berntsen, 
2008). Rather, the extent to which effects associated with traumatic stimuli are or are not 
present in both groups is something to be established empirically.  
 
The Recovered Memory Controversy  
The article by Shobe and Kihlstrom (1997) devoted space to what they believed 
were erroneous claims concerning the possibility that the occurrence of traumatic events 
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could be completely forgotten and then subsequently recalled essentially accurately. One 
of the main foundations of their critique of recovered memories of trauma was the 
position that traumatic events were inherently extremely memorable, and therefore to 
claim that they could be forgotten or repressed ran counter to scientific knowledge 
concerning memory. A similar argument has been made by McNally (2003). From this 
perspective observations or findings concerning impairment in the voluntary recall of 
traumatic events may appear counter-intuitive.   
 It has now become clear that although traumatic events are in general more 
memorable than non-traumatic events, they are not invariably well-remembered (Brewin, 
2011b). Memorability is not conferred by meeting the DSM-IV-TR PTSD stressor 
criterion that defines a traumatic event but by the same criteria of personal significance 
and consequentiality that apply to other events discussed in the autobiographical memory 
literature (M. A. Conway, et al., 1994; Pillemer, 1998). If such events (e.g., happening to 
witness another person being seriously injured in an automobile accident) have little 
relevance to the person’s identity, or if that sense of identity is  fragmented by exposure 
to significant adversity in childhood (Harter, 1998; Harter, Bresnick, Bouchey, & 
Whitesell, 1997), even events that are generally regarded as “traumatic” may be forgotten 
(Brewin, 2011b). Consistent with this, recent research supports the position adopted by 
most professional bodies that some recovered memories of trauma, particularly those that 
do not occur in the context of suggestive therapeutic practices, may be essentially 
accurate (Geraerts et al., 2009). The impairments in voluntary memory reviewed in this 
article may help to explain why some traumatic events are forgotten despite this outcome 
appearing unlikely to outside observers. Other factors that may assist forgetting are 
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specific individual cognitive characteristics (Brewin, 2011b; Geraerts, et al., 2009) and 
the ability to deliberately suppress unwanted mental content (Anderson & Huddleston, 
2011), including autobiographical memories (Noreen & MacLeod, 2013; Stephens, 
Braid, & Hertel, 2013). Recent research has further shown that deliberate suppression 
reduces the occurrence of unwanted intrusions (Levy & Anderson, 2012).  
 
Equating Semantic and Episodic Memory  
Some authors have asserted that the claim that traumatic memories are 
fragmented and lack narrative coherence, as specified in clinical theories of PTSD, is 
contradicted by the fact that in this group the trauma memory tends to be central to the 
person’s overall life story (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; Rubin, Berntsen, et al., 2008). The 
Centrality of Event Scale, which is typically used in these studies, includes such items 
such as “I feel that this event has become a central part of my life story” and “This event 
is making my life different from the life of most other people” (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006). 
These questions clearly differ markedly from the independent judge ratings of 
fragmentation described in the earlier section Voluntary Episodic Memory in PTSD.  
 The assertion of a contradiction between these two bodies of research appears to 
equate conceptual knowledge concerning the fact that the event has occurred and its 
relative prominence in autobiographical memory, with the representation of the event in 
specific episodic memory records. Trauma clinicians and researchers have been aware for 
many years of the impact of trauma on the person’s sense of themselves and have 
proposed that traumatic events can form turning points in people’s construction of their 
own identity (Herman, 1992; C. S. Myers, 1940; Pillemer, 1998; Sutherland & Bryant, 
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2005). According to one highly influential theory, the centrality of the event is a direct 
result of a general motivation to integrate new experience into past schemas (the 
‘completion tendency’), and of the difficulty in so doing due to the shocking content of 
the experience (Horowitz, 1976).  
 Contrary to the claims made by Berntsen and Rubin (2006), there seems to be no 
inherent contradiction between the fact of the trauma having happened dominating much 
of the person’s mental life, while at the same time avoidance of memories of specific 
distressing scenes may leave these fragmented and disconnected. Likewise, there seems 
to be no prima facie contradiction with observations that the implications of the event are 
hard to assimilate within pre-existing knowledge structures. None of these more episodic 
aspects of memory are assessed by the Centrality of Event Scale.  
 
Biological Findings on Emotional Memory  
Shobe and Kihlstrom (1997) noted: “research with both humans and animals 
indicates that high levels of stress enhance rather than impair memory – perhaps by virtue 
of hormones that are released in response to stress and in turn regulate memory storage, 
or perhaps by virtue of activating the amygdala, a subcortical brain structure known to be 
involved in fear and other emotions” (p. 71).  Classic research that emotionally arousing 
events lead to stronger rather than weaker memory (L. Cahill & McGaugh, 1998) is 
frequently adduced to contest claims that trauma memories may be impaired (Berntsen & 
Rubin, 2006; McNally, 2003; Porter & Birt, 2001).  
 The orienting response of increased surprise or interest typically produced in a 
healthy person by emotional materials is completely different, however, from the effects 
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on memory produced by high levels of anxiety. Meta-analytic review has shown that 
individuals’ levels of stress or anxiety correlated with poorer performance on eyewitness 
identification of a perpetrator or target person and on eyewitness recall of details 
associated with the crime (Deffenbacher, Bornstein, Penrod, & McGorty, 2004). More 
anxious people also tend to remember the central details of a witnessed scene as well as 
less anxious people do, but their recognition of background information is poorer, 
suggesting that anxiety may inhibit the formation of complete mental representations of 
complex emotional scenes (Waring, Payne, Schacter, & Kensinger, 2010).  
 It is also well established that high levels of glucocorticoids, an important class of 
stress hormone, adversely affect memory for facts and events (McEwen & Sapolsky, 
1995), facilitating the encoding of events into memory but impairing their retrieval (de 
Quervain, Aerni, Schelling, & Roozendaal, 2009). These findings are consistent with 
evidence in individuals with PTSD that memory for emotionally neutral material is 
impaired (Brewin, Kleiner, Vasterling, & Field, 2007), and that areas of the brain 
centrally involved in the processing of declarative memory, such as the hippocampus, are 
decreased in volume (M. E. Smith, 2005). They are also consistent with the conclusion 
that impairments in voluntary memory for trauma are present in people with disorders 
such as PTSD, but not in healthy samples. 
 
Summary 
 The existence of controversy over whether impairment in the trauma memory is 
part of PTSD may be related to four factors that have figured in the literature: A failure to 
distinguish clinical and healthy samples, the conviction that traumatic events are always 
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well-remembered, a blurring of the distinction between semantic and episodic aspects of 
the trauma memory, and a partial application of relevant biological evidence. When these 
are taken into account, the data on trauma and memory impairment reviewed above do 
not appear to contradict any established cognitive or neurobiological findings. 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Memory in Healthy Participants 
Previous research does provide some examples of the importance of considering 
the role of a separate perceptual memory system. For example, in the “reversed eye-
witness suggestibility design” (Lindsay & Johnson, 1989) participants are provided with 
verbal suggestions about a visual scene before witnessing it. The scene contains some 
items that had been referred to in the verbal narrative and some that had not. In addition, 
some items referred to in the narrative do not appear in the visual scene (the 
misinformation items). Participants subsequently tested on their memory for items 
present in the visual scene by means of a written checklist demonstrate a misinformation 
effect, recalling items that were in the narrative but not in the picture. However, if the test 
is pictorial rather than verbal, the effect is no longer present, presumably because the test 
provides participants with improved access to their perceptual memory of the picture 
rather than their episodic memory of the narrative (Abeles & Morton, 1999). 
There has also been acknowledgment of the role of “involuntary conscious 
memory” in understanding the phenomenon of priming (Richardson-Klavehn & 
Gardiner, 1995). This refers to the possibility that in carrying out a stem completion task 
(e.g., “Complete the stem Har…with the first word that comes to mind”) previously 
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viewed words such as “Harass” will be consciously remembered as well as being able to 
unconsciously affect the choice of word. More recently evidence has accumulated that a 
wide variety of tasks such as generating word associations (C. T. Ball, 2007; Brewin & 
Soni, 2011), passively viewing words and phrases (Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008), or 
deliberately recalling the past (Mace, 2006), are likely to lead to the spontaneous retrieval 
of autobiographical memories complete with visual scene details.  
These results strongly suggest that investigators should routinely assess the 
occurrence of involuntary perceptual memories within voluntary memory tasks such as 
recall of shocking events or of emotional scenes or pictures. For example, debates about 
the consistency or inconsistency of recall may be illuminated by looking separately at the 
consistency across time of voluntary and involuntary components. Whether or not 
involuntary memories are experienced in a particular context is likely to depend on the 
extent to which available cues are uniquely associated with them (Berntsen, Staugaard, & 
Sørensen, 2012). A recent investigation of the cued recall of valenced pictures found that 
presenting cues was more likely to lead to involuntary perceptual memories when 
pictures were negative than when they were positive. Perceptual cues prompted these 
involuntary memories more often than verbal cues, and the occurrence of the involuntary 
memories was strongly related to recall performance (Brewin & Langley, 2012). Just as 
in the trauma film studies reviewed above, involuntary memories of some of the picture 
stimuli continued sporadically over the succeeding week.  
The presence of these striking phenomenological accounts indicates that a 
complete account of recall and recognition, whether dealing with verbal or pictorial 
stimuli, needs to consider the interaction of episodic and perceptual memory. Our current 
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understanding is that perceptual memory should not be expected to be necessarily 
veridical or consistent but rather show partial or selective accuracy. The occurrence of a 
perceptual intrusion nevertheless may contribute to memorial judgement, decision-
making, and control processes in ways we are only beginning to understand. For 
example, a recent neuroimaging study of the suppression of emotional memories found 
evidence for a two-stage process in which initial suppression of sensory components of 
the memory representation was followed by suppression of the multimodal and emotional 
aspects of the representation (Depue, Curran, & Banich, 2007). 
 
Memory in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
The literature reviewed indicates that the long-held view that under extreme stress 
there are differential effects on multiple memory systems (Jacobs & Nadel, 1985; Janet, 
1904; Metcalfe & Jacobs, 1998; Terr, 1991; van der Kolk & Fisler, 1995) is scientifically 
plausible. This view is supported by recent evidence that individual brain regions are 
affected by stress in very different ways. For example, a study of neuronal morphology 
showed that the same stress experience produced dendritic atrophy and debranching in 
the hippocampus at the same time as producing enhanced dendritic arborization in the 
amygdala (Vyas, Mitra, Rao, & Chattarji, 2002).  
The increased functioning of the amygdala under stress has generally been seen as 
consistent with the formation of overly strong implicit memories related to autonomic 
conditioning and fear, including priming (Metcalfe & Jacobs, 1998; Pitman, Shalev, & 
Orr, 2000). Potentially, however, the amygdala could also contribute to the encoding and 
consolidation of long-term perceptual memories that remain consciously accessible. The 
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latest version of the dual representation theory of PTSD (Brewin, et al., 2010) specifies in 
more detail the original description of an image-based memory system (‘situationally 
accessible memory’ or SAM) in terms of a contemporary model of spatial memory and 
imagery (Byrne, et al., 2007). The authors suggest that these perceptual memories consist 
of ‘sensation-near’ representations (‘S-reps’) which are the product of processing in the 
dorsal visual stream, insula, and amygdala, and which are specialized for action on the 
environment. S-reps capture the entire visual field, are egocentric (rely on the person’s 
own viewpoint), are automatically activated by related cues, and are relatively inflexible.  
The updated theory also replaces the concept of ‘verbally accessible memories’ 
(VAM) described by Brewin et al. (1996) by proposing parallel contextualized 
representations (‘C-reps’) that are the product of processing in the ventral visual stream 
and medial temporal lobe. C-reps are selective, correspond to the focus of conscious 
attention, are allocentric (permit the adoption of alternative viewpoints), and can be 
strategically or automatically retrieved. C-reps support episodic memories and verbal 
accounts of a traumatic event, whereas S-reps support involuntary flashbacks. The theory 
suggests that during a traumatic event the encoding of S-reps (perceptual memories) is 
strengthened, whereas the encoding of C-reps (contextualized episodic memories), and 
the connections between S-reps and C-reps, are weakened. This leaves individuals able to 
retrieve C-reps of the event when they want to deliberately think or communicate about 
the trauma, although these are likely to be fragmented and disorganized. Reminders of 
the trauma are likely to lead to the automatic retrieval of S-reps, with vivid, 
decontextualized images being experienced as the event happening again in the present. 
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In tests of the theory it was shown that individuals who had lesser contextual 
(allocentric) memory abilities were, as predicted, more vulnerable to developing 
involuntary memories of a traumatic film over the following week (Bisby, et al., 2010). 
The naturally occurring intrusive memories of such individuals are also more strongly 
characterized by a lack of temporal context (increased “nowness”) (Glazer, Mason, King, 
& Brewin, 2013). These findings are consistent with previous work showing an 
association between PTSD and a specific deficit in allocentric spatial processing that 
appeared to function as a preexisting risk factor (Gilbertson et al., 2007), as well as with 
the finding that greater efficiency of temporal-lobe-based spatial configuration learning 
predicts fewer intrusive trauma memories of a trauma film (Meyer et al., 2013).  
It has also been proposed that the kind of contextual-encoding deficit described by 
dual representation and other theories may lead to subsequent inappropriate 
generalization of past learning to novel situations in the form of either over- or 
undergeneralization (C. E. Myers et al., 2003). The prediction that PTSD patients should 
therefore be equivalent to controls in learning initial stimulus-outcome associations but 
show a selective deficit in generalizing this learning to novel situations was recently 
confirmed (Levy-Gigi et al., 2012). 
At a neural level it has been found that PTSD patients reporting more frequent 
flashbacks have reduced brain volume in bilateral inferior temporal cortex, an area of the 
brain that is part of the ventral visual stream and is involved in processing the context of 
visual objects and scenes (Kroes, Whalley, Rugg, & Brewin, 2011). A parallel functional 
MRI study investigated neural responses to the recognition or words and phrases from the 
trauma narratives of the same patients, contrasting those that elicited or did not elicit 
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flashbacks (Whalley et al., 2013).  Flashbacks were associated with increased activation 
in sensory and motor areas, and with decreased activation in the parahippocampal gyrus, 
part of the medial temporal lobe.  
It is important to note that within dual representation theory contextualization 
refers to a process whereby selective attention leads to a recoding of the sensory input 
into an abstract structural description. This recoding then permits interaction with other 
knowledge, better organized consciously accessible memories, and reduced involuntary 
intrusions. Contrary to recent suggestions (Pearson, 2012; Pearson, et al., 2012), the 
process does not bear any straightforward relationship to the amount of contextual or 
explanatory information present in the input. Different contextual or explanatory content 
could facilitate either the formation of C-reps (for example, by encouraging alternative 
visual perspectives), or S-reps (for example, by increasing emotional engagement or 
dissociation). Studies which show that providing more explanatory information at 
encoding increases subsequent intrusions (Pearson, 2012; Pearson, et al., 2012) are quite 
consistent with dual representation theory (Brewin & Burgess, in press).  
The distinction between perceptual and episodic memory also provides an account 
of the apparently paradoxical effect, alluded to at the beginning of this article, whereby 
repeatedly rehearsing a trauma memory in therapy leads to a reliable reduction in 
symptoms including the involuntary recall of that memory. According to dual 
representation theory, by retrieving the distressing images and holding them in conscious 
attention, stronger C-reps are formed that provide a context for the memory in time and 
place. Further, associations between corresponding C-reps and S-reps are strengthened. 
Now, when reminders are encountered, the memories retrieved are contextualized and are 
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experienced as belonging to the past rather than being a source of danger in the present. 
This account is compatible with many contemporary theories of human and animal 
cognition (Gold, 2004; Kesner & Rogers, 2004; Poldrack & Packard, 2003) which favor 
the idea that learning produces a variety of new representations that can collaborate or 
compete with existing memories for control of behavior. The concept of retrieval 
competition between alternative representations features strongly in the literature on 
verbal overshadowing (Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990; Brandimonte & Collina, 
2008), and has similarly been incorporated into several models of therapeutic change 
(Bjork & Bjork, 2006; Brewin, 2006). 
This account is primarily applicable to psychological treatment for established 
PTSD. There is controversy over whether rehearsing the trauma memory is effective as a 
measure to prevent PTSD in populations very recently exposed to trauma (e.g., as part of 
psychological debriefing). Reviews have suggested that at this time the procedure is 
ineffective and may even be harmful (McNally, Bryant, & Ehlers, 2003; van Emmerik, 
Kamphuis, Hulsbosch, & Emmelkamp, 2002). It should be noted, however, that studies 
of psychological debriefing have not typically sought to identify high-risk samples, to 
rehearse the trauma memory in a particular way, or to do it more than once. There is 
some preliminary evidence that methods involving more guided or structured rehearsal 
may prove to have preventive value in selected samples (Gidron et al., 2001; Gidron et 
al., 2007), but the issue remains controversial. 
 The distinction between perceptual and episodic representations may assist in 
explaining a variety of phenomena including some instances of false memory creation. In 
a recent study (Brewin, Huntley, & Whalley, 2012) participants with PTSD wrote a 
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trauma narrative and reported during what parts of the narrative they experienced 
flashbacks. They were later presented with stimuli from flashback and non-flashback 
parts of their narrative, mixed with foil stimuli, and judged whether they belonged to their 
own narrative. They also reported whether stimuli elicited a flashback during this 
recognition test. Overall reporting a flashback at test was associated with significantly 
better recognition performance. However, flashbacks were occasionally reported to foil 
stimuli, which were then significantly more likely to be wrongly attributed to the person’s 
own narrative. These findings illustrate how perceptual and episodic memory systems 
may under some conditions collaborate to improve recall but under other conditions 
compete, potentially accounting for some cases of false trauma memories. 
 Three areas for future research would especially benefit the understanding of 
trauma-related psychological disorders. The first concerns the voluntary memories 
produced by individuals with PTSD. It is still unclear whether the underlying 
representation in memory is indeed disorganized or whether the disorganization occurs 
during the production of the trauma narrative. On the one hand the positive correlations 
between dissociation reported to have occurred during the trauma and indices of memory 
fragmentation suggest that there is a disturbance at the stage of encoding. But it is also 
possible that there is a disturbance during retrieval, caused for example by the 
spontaneous emergence of emotion-laden images that disrupt conscious attempts at recall. 
As previously noted (see section on Long-Term Perceptual Memory for Autobiographical 
Events), the intrusion of such images has been linked to spontaneous shifts into the 
present tense (Pillemer, et al., 1998), although with a few exceptions (Hellawell & 
Brewin, 2004; Jelinek et al., 2010) this has rarely been studied in PTSD samples.  
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Another phenomenon described by trauma researchers is that recall and reliving of 
voluntary memories within PTSD therapy often produces hypermnesia for details of the 
traumatic event. Hypermnesia is a well-established experimental phenomenon (Erdelyi, 
2010), particularly in respect of pictorial material (Erdelyi & Becker, 1974), and there are 
demonstrations of a variety of interventions leading to recall of additional details of a briefly 
perceived stimulus (Haber & Erdelyi, 1967; Thompson, Kosslyn, Hoffman, & van der Kooij, 
2008). There are obvious parallels between the repeated attempts at recall characteristic of 
hypermnesia experiments and the repeated reliving that occurs in trauma therapy. It would be 
informative to know whether the clinical observations of hypermnesia are related to the 
processes identified in these experimental findings.  
Finally, although the functional independence of perceptual and episodic memories is 
becoming increasingly clear, research is needed on the way in which they interact to produce 
the involuntary memories that characterize PTSD. For example, most of the demonstrations of 
the independence of involuntary and voluntary memory within the trauma film paradigm are 
confounded with this perceptual/episodic distinction. It would be valuable to conduct more 
studies measuring both involuntary images and involuntary thoughts derived from the same 
sensory input, and to test whether they are differentially related to indices of voluntary recall 
and recognition. It is also important to bear in mind that to date much of this research has 
been based on healthy volunteers, utilizing different kinds of secondary task with the intention 
of strengthening or weakening different competing representations (Holmes, et al., 2004; 
Holmes, et al., 2010). These studies have been extremely valuable in providing evidence for 
key theoretical predictions arising from clinical theories of PTSD, but much remains to be 
done to establish their validity in clinical settings and clinical samples. 
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Coda: “Special Mechanisms” in Memory 
 
A final implication of the review is for the series of debates that have revolved around 
the idea of “special mechanisms” in memory. In presenting their ground-breaking work on 
vivid flashbulb memories, Brown and Kulik (1977) speculated on the existence of a special 
mechanism to explain their data, “Now Print”, leading to the publication of numerous articles 
that attempted to decide whether flashbulb memories were any more accurate or reliable than 
other memories rather than directly addressing individuals’ phenomenological experience. 
Subsequently Shobe and Kihlstrom (1997) criticized the idea that traumatic events could be 
subject to special memory mechanisms such as repression or dissociation, leading to a glut of 
articles questioning these hypothetical mechanisms at the expense of studying the actual 
phenomenon, i.e. the forgetting of traumatic events.  
More recently, Rubin and colleagues (Rubin, Boals, et al., 2008) contrasted “special 
mechanism” accounts of memory in PTSD, in which they included the clinical theories 
described in this article, with “basic mechanism” accounts such as that of Rubin, Berntsen et 
al. (2008). They suggested that “special mechanism” accounts derived from clinical research 
into PTSD whereas basic mechanism accounts derived from “naturalistic and experimental 
research on memory, with the aim of providing a broad understanding of memory in diverse 
contexts, including, but not limited to, traumatic events” (p. 592).  
 It should be evident from this review that there is no such clear-cut distinction; 
rather, both ‘special mechanism’ and ‘basic mechanism’ accounts of memory in PTSD 
are equally grounded in a broad appreciation of human memory phenomena and in a 
variety of different methodological approaches utilizing clinical and healthy samples. The 
theories do, however, make differing predictions and some of these have been addressed 
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in this review (e.g., clinical theories predict an impairment of voluntary memory for the 
traumatic event whereas Rubin, Berntsen et al., 2008, predict enhanced voluntary 
memory). Where differing conclusions rest on different methodologies, e.g., the use of 
observer ratings versus single self-report items to assess the quality of traumatic memory 
(see Voluntary Episodic Memory in PTSD), these should be addressed empirically.  
To invoke “special mechanisms” implies that we have a good scientific 
understanding of how memory behaves under normative conditions. But it is increasingly 
clear that the search for generally applicable laws of memory has failed (Roediger, 2008). 
Instead of framing questions in terms of a “special mechanism”, therefore, it will likely 
be more fruitful to consider how ordinary memory mechanisms may operate under usual 
and unusual circumstances. The existence of long-term perceptual memory 
representations, and the differing relations they have with episodic memory, open up a 
range of empirical questions and techniques that can be exploited to investigate the 
richness and variety of memory phenomena in both clinical and nonclinical arenas. 
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Table 1 
Studies of quality of voluntary memory for traumatic events in acute stress disorder and posttraumatic stress disorder 
 
 
Study 
N Groups Material Measure Findings 
Harvey & 
Bryant 
(1999) 
29 MVA  
survivors (14M) 
ASD/No ASD Trauma narrative Judges’ ratings: 
Disorganization of individual 
narrative elements 
 
ASD more disorganized than non-ASD 
(p<.05) 
Halligan et 
al. (2003) 
study 1 
81 assault 
survivors (48M) 
Current PTSD 
Recovered PTSD 
No PTSD 
Trauma narrative 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Trauma Memory 
Questionnaire 
Judges’ ratings: 
Disorganization of individual 
narrative elements 
 
Overall coherence 
 
 
Self-rating of disorganization  
(5 items) 
 
Current PTSD (p < .01) and recovered 
PTSD (p < .05) more disorganized than 
no PTSD 
Current PTSD (p < .001) and recovered 
PTSD (p < .01) more disorganized than 
no PTSD 
Current PTSD more disorganized than 
no PTSD (p < .01) 
Halligan et 
al. (2003) 
study 2 
73 assault 
survivors (41M) 
PTSD/No PTSD Trauma Memory 
Questionnaire 
Self-rating of disorganization  
(5 items) of the assault and a 
negative, non-traumatic event 
Significant group x memory type 
interaction (p < .01): Disorganization 
greater for assault than non-traumatic 
event, this effect strongest in PTSD 
group 
Berntsen et 
al. (2003) 
113 trauma 
survivors1 
PTSD/No PTSD Memory 
Questionnaire 
Coherence of memory (1 item) No group differences (p < .05) 
Rubin et al. 
(2004) 
50 military 
veterans (50M) 
PTSD Autobiographical 
Memory 
Questionnaire 
in respect of 4 
types of memory 
Coherence of story (1 item) 
 
Fragmentation (1 item) 
Trend for traumatic memory to be more 
coherent than non-traumatic memories 
No differences between memories (p < 
.05) 
Jones et al. 
(2007) 
131 MVA 
survivors (52M) 
ASD/No ASD 1 
week post-trauma 
PTSD/No PTSD 6 
weeks post-trauma 
PTSD/No PTSD 3 
months post-trauma 
Trauma narrative Judges’ ratings: 
Repetition 
 
 
Non-consecutive chunks 
 
 
No significant differences at 1 or 6 
weeks. PTSD at 3 months more 
repetition than no PTSD (p < .01) 
No significant differences at 1 or 6 
weeks. PTSD at 3 months more non-
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Overall coherence 
consecutive than no PTSD (p < .001) 
ASD less coherent than no ASD (p < 
.001); PTSD at 6 weeks less coherent 
than no PTSD (p < .01); PTSD at 3 
months less coherent than no PTSD (p 
< .001) 
Jelinek et al. 
(2009) 
81 survivors of a 
single trauma 
(38M) 
30 non-
traumatized 
(11M) 
PTSD/No PTSD/ 
non-traumatized 
Trauma and non-
trauma narratives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Trauma Memory 
Questionnaire: 
trauma and non-
trauma memory 
Judges’ ratings: 
Disorganization of individual 
narrative elements 
 
 
 
Overall coherence  
 
 
 
Self-rating of disorganization  
(5 items) 
 
Significant group x memory type 
interaction (p < .01): Disorganization 
greater for assault than non-traumatic 
event, this effect strongest in PTSD 
 
Marginal group x memory type 
interaction (p < .07): Disorganization 
greater for assault than non-traumatic 
event, this effect strongest in PTSD 
No significant interaction (p < .05) 
 
Kenardy et 
al. (2007) 
87 child survivors 
of a trauma aged 
7-15 (59M) 
Subsyndromal 
PTSD by parent 
report/no PTSD 
Verbal trauma 
narrative 
Judges’ ratings: 
Temporal disorganization 
 
PTSD more disorganized than non-
PTSD (p<.05) 
Salmond et 
al. (2011) 
50 child survivors 
of a trauma aged 
8-17 (25M) 
ASD/no ASD Verbal trauma 
and non-trauma 
narratives 
Judges’ ratings: 
Disorganization of individual 
narrative elements 
 
 
Overall coherence 
 
Significant group x memory type 
interaction (p < .01): Disorganization 
greater for trauma than non-trauma 
narrative in ASD only 
Significant group x memory type 
interaction (p < .05): Disorganization 
greater for trauma than non-trauma 
narrative in ASD only 
 
Footnote. 1 Gender breakdown for sample not provided. 
M = males; ASD = Acute Stress Disorder; PTSD = Posttraumatic Stress Disorder; MVA = motor vehicle accident. 
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Table 2 
Effects of secondary tasks on voluntary and involuntary memory of a traumatic film 
 
 
 
 
 
Study 
N Film 
modality 
(clips;  
time) 
Secondary tasks  Timing of 
tasks 
Voluntary memory results1 Involuntary memory 
results1 
Brewin & 
Saunders (2001) 
39 
(19M) 
Visual 
real-life 
5 clips 
(12:30) 
Spatial tapping (S) 
No-task control (C) 
 
During film Cued recall: 
S=4.53a (1.54)  
C=4.95a (2.16) 
Intrusive images 
over 2 weeks:  
S=1.95a (2.21)  
C=5.32b (4.24) 
Holmes et al. 
(2004) exp. 1 
512 Visual 
real-life 
5 clips 
(12:30) 
Spatial tapping (S) 
No-task control (C) 
 
During film Cued recall:  
S=8.32a (1.98)  
C=8.06a (2.83)  
 
Intrusive images 
over 1 week:  
S=2.23a (2.92) 
C=4.94b (4.29) 
Holmes et al. 
(2004) exp. 2 
80 
(41M) 
Visual 
real-life 
5 clips 
(12:30) 
Complex tapping (S3) 
Overpractised tapping 
(S2) 
Simple tapping (S1) 
No-task control (C) 
 
During film Cued recall:  
S3=6.52a (2.38)  
S2=6.88a (2.19)  
S1=7.58a (2.28)  
C=7.10a (2.79) 
Recognition: 
S3=10.10a (2.79) 
S2=9.35a (2.46) 
S1=10.50ab (2.24) 
C=11.85b (2.78) 
Intrusive images 
over 1 week:  
S3=3.25a (3.55) 
S2=3.70a (3.28) 
S1=5.50ab (5.11) 
C=6.65b (8.36) 
Holmes et al. 
(2004) exp. 3 
60 
(27M) 
Visual 
real-life 
5 clips 
(12:30) 
Describing out loud 
(VE) 
No-task control (C) 
Counting backwards in 
3s (V) 
During film Cued recall:  
VE=8.16a (2.32)  
C=7.44a (1.95) 
V=7.63a (2.11) 
Recognition:  
VE=10.58a (2.41)  
C=9.63a (2.73) 
V=9.05a (2.70) 
Intrusive images 
over 1 week:  
VE=5.10ab (3.40) 
C=3.10a (3.60) 
V=9.70b (10.47) 
Stuart et al. (2006) 20  
(7 M) 
Visual 
real-life 
5 clips 
Making shapes (S)3 
No-task control (C) 3 
 
During film Not measured Intrusive images 
over 1 week:  
S=0.95a (1.10) 
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(12:30) C=2.40b (1.93) 
Nixon et al. (2007) 43 Visual 
fiction 
1 clip 
(5:00) 
Remembering 9-digit 
number (V) 
No-task control (C) 
During film Recall sequence: 
V=2.05a (1.61) 
C=3.10b (1.41) 
Recall performance: 
V=4.45a (1.84) 
C=5.19a (1.75) 
Recognition (d’): 
V=0.23a (0.65) 
C=0.46a (0.56) 
Impact of Event 
Scale Intrusion score 
over 1 week: 
V=1.03a (0.50) 
C=1.01a (0.58) 
Nixon et al. (2009) 40 Visual 
fiction 
1 clip 
(5:00) 
Remembering 9-digit 
number (V) 
No-task control (C) 
Immediately 
after film 
Recall sequence: 
V=4.35a (1.23) 
C=4.30a (1.26) 
Recall performance: 
V=5.35a (1.73) 
C=5.70a (1.72) 
Recognition (d’): 
V=0.25a (0.88) 
C=-0.01a (0.78) 
Intrusive images 
over 1 week:  
V=10.50a (10.63) 
C=7.20a (4.55) 
 
Krans et al. (2009) 76  
(11 M) 
Visual 
real-life 
3 clips 
(6:48) 
Describing out loud 
(VE) 
No-task control (C) 
Counting backwards in 
3s (V) 
During film Cued recall:  
VE=4.38a (1.86) 
C=5.48a (1.59) 
V=2.97b (2.15) 
Recognition: 
VE=5.63a (1.21)  
C=5.78a (1.31) 
V=5.17a (1.34) 
Intrusive images 
over 1 week:  
VE=3.75a (2.41) 
C=3.53a (3.26) 
V=2.07a (2.02) 
Holmes et al. 
(2009) 4 
40  
(22 M) 
Visual 
real-life 
11 clips 
(12:00) 
Tetris (S) 
No-task control (C) 
30 mins 
post-film 
Recognition: 
S=20.10a (3.44) 
C=20.20a (2.93) 
Intrusive images 
over 1 week:  
S=2.80a (0.59)  
C=6.70b (1.22) 
Bourne et al. 
(2010) exp. 14 
40  
(23 M) 
Visual 
real-life 
5 clips 
(13.00) 
Spatial tapping (S) 
No-task control (C) 
Counting backwards in 
3s (V) 
During film Cued recall:  
S=9.81a (2.23) 
C=9.07a (2.81)  
V=6.20b (2.24) 
Recognition: 
S=11.00a (3.90)  
Intrusive images 
over 1 week:  
S=1.45a; (1.86) 
C=3.79b (2.91) 
V=6.33b (4.97) 
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C=10.29a (2.23)  
V=8.73a (2.63) 
Bourne et al. 
(2010) exp. 24 
38 
(12 M) 
Visual 
real-life 
10 clips 
(21:30) 
No-task control (C) 
Counting backwards in 
7s (V) 
During film Recognition: 
C=19.53a (1.90)  
V=18.11b (2.35) 
Intrusive images 
over 1 week: 
C=2.84a (1.61) 
V=5.32b (4.10) 
Krans et al. 
(2010a) 
86 
(26M) 
Auditory 
real-life 
5 clips 
(11:42) 
Making shapes (S) 
No-task control (C) 
Simple counting 1-6 
(V) 
During 
narrative 
Cued recall:  
S=5.56a (2.29)  
C=5.86a (2.10)  
V=5.61a (2.23) 
Recognition: 
S=7.07a (1.77)  
C=8.00a (1.63)  
V=7.56a (1.43) 
Intrusive images 
over 1 week:  
S=2.48a (2.23) 
C=4.57b (3.69)  
V=2.52a (2.55) 
Krans et al. 
(2010b) 
54 
(20M) 
Visual 
real-life 
4 clips 
Spatial tapping (S) 
No-task control (C) 
Gum-chewing (P) 
During film Cued recall:  
S=5.19a (2.34)  
C=7.00b (1.56)  
P=6.21ab (1.47) 
Recognition: 
S=10.81a (1.60)  
C=11.47a (1.90)  
P=11.00a (1.86) 
Intrusive images 
over 1 week:  
S=1.64a (1.86)  
C=4.28b (4.79)  
P=2.63b (1.61) 
Holmes et al. 
(2010) exp. 14 
60 
(30M) 
Visual 
real-life 
15 clips 
(21:00) 
Tetris (S) 
No-task control (C) 
Pub Quiz (V) 
30 mins 
post-film 
Recognition: 
S=20.65a (2.87)  
C=20.95a (7.13)  
V=19.65a (4.68) 
Intrusive images 
over 1 week:  
S=2.90a (1.61) 
C=5.10b (3.80) 
V=7.70c (4.20) 
Holmes et al. 
(2010) exp. 24 
78 
(36M) 
Visual 
real-life 
11 clips 
(12:00) 
Tetris (S) 
No-task control (C) 
Pub Quiz (V) 
4 hours 
post-film 
Recognition: 
S=19.46a (3.33)  
C=20.61a (2.57)  
V=20.50a (2.45) 
Intrusive images 
over 1 week:  
S=3.50a (2.96) 
C=6.65b (6.24) 
V=7.53b (6.99) 
Deeprose et al. 
(2012) exp. 14 
60 
(21M) 
Visual 
real-life 
13 clips 
(9:00) 
Spatial tapping (S) 
No-task control (C) 
Counting backwards in 
3s (V) 
Immediately 
post-film 
Not measured Intrusive images 
over 1 week:  
S=2.00a (2.49)  
C=4.50b (4.76) 
V=4.70b (1.65) 
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Deeprose et al. 
(2012) exp. 24 
75 
(38M) 
Visual 
real-life 
14 clips 
(22:00) 
Spatial tapping (S) 
No-task control (C) 
Counting backwards in 
7s (V) 
30 mins 
post-film 
Recognition: 
S=17.68a (3.16) 
C=17.92a (2.89) 
V=17.76a (2.95) 
Intrusive images 
over 1 week:  
S=2.96a (3.16)  
C=4.92b (3.55) 
V=6.76b (5.41) 
Logan & 
O’Kearney (2012) 
105 
(52M) 
Visual 
real-life 
1 clip 
(9:00) 
Making shapes (S) 
No-task control (C) 
Counting backwards in 
3s (V) 
 
During film Not measured Intrusive images 
over 1 week:  
S=8.11a (9.83)  
C=8.83a (9.88) 
V=7.15a (5.04) 
 
Footnote. 1 Data are means (standard deviations). Different subscripts (a, b, c) indicate significant differences (p < .05); 2 Gender breakdown for sample 
not provided; 3 Within-subject design; 4 Data supplied by the authors. 
M = males; C = no-task control; P = propriospatial imagery; S = visuospatial imagery; V = verbal interference; VE = verbal enhancement. 
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Table 3 
Relation between voluntary episodic recall and involuntary intrusion of same stimuli: Correlational studies 
 
 
 
Study 
N Stimulus Voluntary memory 
measure 
Involuntary memory 
measure 
Relation of 
voluntary to 
involuntary 
measures 
Brewin & 
Saunders (2001) 
39 
(19M) 
Trauma film Cued recall 
 
Intrusive images over 2 
weeks 
Correlation not 
significant (p<.05) 
Holmes et al. 
(2004) exp. 1 
511 Trauma film Cued recall Intrusive images over 1 
week 
r = -.06 
Holmes et al. 
(2004) exp. 2 
80 
(41M) 
Trauma film Cued recall 
Recognition 
Intrusive images over 1 
week 
r = .01 
r = -.08 
Holmes et al. 
(2004) exp. 3 
60 
(27M) 
Trauma film Cued recall 
Recognition 
Intrusive images over 1 
week 
r = .04 
r = .08 
Michael & Ehlers 
(2007) exp. 2 
351 Traumatic and 
neutral picture 
stories 
Recognition Reexperiencing over 1 
month  
 
r = -.40 
Hagenaars et al. 
(2008) 
79 
(11M) 
Trauma film Cued recall Intrusive images over 1 
week 
r = -.06 
Nixon et al. 
(2009) 
80 
(41M) 
Fictional trauma 
film 
Recognition Intrusive images over 1 
week 
Correlation not 
significant (p<.05) 
Ferree & Cahill 
(2009) 
48 
(16M) 
Emotional and 
neutral film clips 
Free recall Rating of intrusive 
memories after 48 hours 
r = .57 
Krans et al. 
(2010b) 
54 
(20M) 
Trauma film Cued recall 
Recognition 
Intrusive images over 1 
week 
Correlation with 
cued recall not 
significant (p<.05) 
Ferree et al. 
(2011) 
40 
(0M) 
Emotional film 
clips 
Free recall Rating of intrusive 
memories after 48 hours 
r = .28 
Sündermann et al. 
(2013) 
51 
(27M) 
Traumatic and 
neutral picture 
stories 
Recognition Intrusive images over 2 
weeks 
Intrusive images over 3 
months 
r = -.05 
 
r = -.28 
 
Footnote. 1 Gender breakdown for sample not available. 
M = males. 
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Table 4 
Relation between voluntary episodic recall and involuntary intrusion of same stimuli: Additional experimental studies 
 
 
 
Study 
N Stimulus Voluntary memory 
measure 
Involuntary memory 
measure 
Manipulation Effect on voluntary 
(VM) & involuntary 
(IVM) measures 
       
Krans et al. 
(2009a)  
571 Trauma film Cued recall Intrusive images over 1 
week 
Within-subjects: 
immediate 
recognition of 
scenes vs. no 
recognition 
Recognition 
increased VM (p <  
.01) and decreased 
IVM (p < .05) 
Bisby et al. (2009) 48 
(24M) 
Trauma film Cued recall 
Recognition 
Intrusive images over 1 
week 
Between-subjects: 
high alcohol vs. low 
alcohol vs. placebo 
Alcohol had linear 
effect on VM and 
quadratic effect on 
IVM 
Bisby et al. (2010) 48 
(24M) 
Trauma film Cued recall 
Recognition 
Intrusive images over 1 
week 
Between-subjects: 
high alcohol vs. low 
alcohol vs. placebo 
Alcohol had linear 
effect on VM and 
quadratic effect on 
IVM 
Hagenaars & 
Arntz (2012) 
511 Trauma film Cued recall Intrusive images over 1 
week 
Between-subjects: 
imagery rescripting 
vs. positive imagery 
Rescripting 
increased VM (p < 
.05) and decreased 
IVM (p < .05) 
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Pearson et al. 
(2012) exp. 1 
 
 
Pearson et al. 
(2012) exp. 2 
 
 
Pearson (2012) 
40 
(14M) 
 
 
40 
(19M) 
 
 
38 
(8M) 
Positive and 
negative pictures 
 
 
Positive and 
negative pictures 
 
 
Trauma film 
Recognition 
 
 
 
Free recall 
Recognition 
 
 
Cued recall 
Recognition 
Intrusive images over 1 
week 
 
 
Intrusive images over 1 
week 
 
 
Intrusive images over 1 
week 
Within-subjects: 
Extra context at 
encoding vs. no 
context 
Within-subjects: 
Extra context at 
encoding vs. no 
context 
Between-subjects: 
Audio commentary 
vs. no commentary 
Extra context had 
no effect on VM but 
increased IVM (p < 
.05) 
Extra context had 
no effect on VM but 
increased IVM (p < 
.001) 
Extra context had 
no effect on VM but 
increased IVM (p < 
.05) 
Ehlers et al. 
(2012) 
122 
(58) 
Traumatic and 
neutral picture 
stories 
Recognition Intrusive images over 1 
week 
Between-subjects: 
Verbal elaboration 
vs. exposure vs. 
control 
Elaboration and 
exposure had no 
effect on VM but 
decreased IVM (p < 
.05) 
 
Footnote. 1 Gender breakdown for sample not available. 
M = males. 
 
 
 
